Are random events expected to be small? Karl Halvor TeigenAlf Børre Kanten. Psychological Research, September 30 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-019-01252-9
Abstract: People’s intuitions about mathematical and statistical concepts often include features that are not a part of the formal definitions. We argue that randomness and related concepts (events happening “accidentally”, “coincidentally” or “by chance”) are typically assumed to occur in a context of small rather than large events. Five experiments were designed to test the hypothesis of an association between perceived randomness and size. In Experiment 1 and 2, statements describing small outcomes as due to chance were judged to be more natural and to make better sense than corresponding statements about large outcomes (or about small outcomes not due to chance). Experiment 3 showed that people imagine that stories about randomness in daily life should preferably start with small events, even when they eventually turn out to be consequential (e.g., stories about an apparently random meeting ending with marriage). Experiment 4 demonstrated that small changes in a graph of a random walk were seen as random, whereas large changes were perceived as potentially nonrandom. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that small animals are believed to display more random behavior than larger ones. This applied also to fictional creatures with nonsense names, where size was implicitly suggested by the names’ phonetic qualities. Analogical instances can be found in the history of science, all the way back to Lucretius’ doctrine of the tiny “swerves” of atoms. The pervasive association between smallness and randomness might be partly due to real-world observations and partly to cognitive and motivational constraints.
Monday, September 30, 2019
90 countries, 45 years of analysis: Financial repression (restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, etc.) poses a significant drag on growth, 0.4-0.7 percentage points
Financial Repression is Knocking at the Door, Again. Etibar Jafarov,Rodolfo Maino,Marco Pani. IMF Working Paper No. 19/211. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/09/30/Financial-Repression-is-Knocking-at-the-Door-Again-48641
Summary: Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.
Summary: Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.
Children of divorced parents are less honest than children of non-divorced parents; psychological counseling improves their honesty, and fails to improve children of non-divorced parents
Parents’ marital status, psychological counseling and dishonest kindergarten children: An experimental study. Yossef Tobol, Gideon Yaniv. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, September 30 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.012
Highlights
• An experiment with kindergarten children is conducted to reveal their level of honesty.
• Children of divorced parents are less honest than children of non-divorced parents.
• Psychological counseling improves honesty of children of divorced parents.
• Psychological counseling fails to improve honesty of children of non-divorced parents.
Abstract: The present paper reports the results of an experiment which studied the effects of parents’ marital status (divorced or non-divorced) and psychological counseling (administered or not) on the honesty level of kindergarten children. Data on marital status and psychological counseling was anonymously provided by the kindergarten teachers and children's level of honesty was assessed by a flip-coin task which rewarded a self-reported favorable outcome. The experiment gave rise to two major results: first, children of divorced parents are less honest than children of non-divorced parents and second, psychological counseling helps improve honesty among children of divorced parents but fails to do so among children of non-divorced parents. No gender effect was found.
Keywords: Kindergarten childrenDishonest behaviorFlip coin taskPsychological counseling
Highlights
• An experiment with kindergarten children is conducted to reveal their level of honesty.
• Children of divorced parents are less honest than children of non-divorced parents.
• Psychological counseling improves honesty of children of divorced parents.
• Psychological counseling fails to improve honesty of children of non-divorced parents.
Abstract: The present paper reports the results of an experiment which studied the effects of parents’ marital status (divorced or non-divorced) and psychological counseling (administered or not) on the honesty level of kindergarten children. Data on marital status and psychological counseling was anonymously provided by the kindergarten teachers and children's level of honesty was assessed by a flip-coin task which rewarded a self-reported favorable outcome. The experiment gave rise to two major results: first, children of divorced parents are less honest than children of non-divorced parents and second, psychological counseling helps improve honesty among children of divorced parents but fails to do so among children of non-divorced parents. No gender effect was found.
Keywords: Kindergarten childrenDishonest behaviorFlip coin taskPsychological counseling
Growth has been good after reform in Africa and Latin America, in contrast to the “lost decades” of the 80s and 90s
In Search of Reforms for Growth: New Stylized Facts on Policy and Growth Outcomes. William Easterly. NBER Working Paper No. 26318, September 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26318
Abstract: The lack of growth response to “Washington Consensus” policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s led to widespread doubts about the value of such reforms. This paper updates these stylized facts by analyzing moderate to extreme levels of inflation, black market premiums, currency overvaluation, negative real interest rates and abnormally low trade shares to GDP. It finds three new stylized facts: (1) policy outcomes worldwide have improved a lot since the 1990s, (2) improvements in policy outcomes and improvements in growth across countries are correlated with each other (3) growth has been good after reform in Africa and Latin America, in contrast to the “lost decades” of the 80s and 90s. This paper makes no claims about causality. However, if the old stylized facts on disappointing growth accompanying reforms led to doubts about economic reforms, new stylized facts should lead to some positive updating of such beliefs.
Abstract: The lack of growth response to “Washington Consensus” policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s led to widespread doubts about the value of such reforms. This paper updates these stylized facts by analyzing moderate to extreme levels of inflation, black market premiums, currency overvaluation, negative real interest rates and abnormally low trade shares to GDP. It finds three new stylized facts: (1) policy outcomes worldwide have improved a lot since the 1990s, (2) improvements in policy outcomes and improvements in growth across countries are correlated with each other (3) growth has been good after reform in Africa and Latin America, in contrast to the “lost decades” of the 80s and 90s. This paper makes no claims about causality. However, if the old stylized facts on disappointing growth accompanying reforms led to doubts about economic reforms, new stylized facts should lead to some positive updating of such beliefs.
Gluten aversion is not limited to the political left; perhaps most surprising, supporters of Donald Trump are more likely to identify as avoiding gluten, relative to non-supporters
Gluten aversion is not limited to the political left. Trey Malone, F. Bailey Norwood. Agriculture and Human Values, June 20 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10460-019-09958-7
Abstract: Despite a heightened political discourse surrounding food choices, few studies have identified connections between political beliefs and consumer perceptions. Using gluten as an example, this article identifies how political opinions relate to opinions of food products. If an avoidance of gluten is a biological condition and not a social construct, there should be no correlation between political opinions and gluten avoidance. Our study uncovers a complex relationship between the social construction of gluten avoidance and the potential role of political views. Perhaps most surprising, we find that supporters of Donald Trump are more likely to identify as avoiding gluten, relative to non-supporters. Findings suggest that future research might benefit from considering the political beliefs of consumers when estimating models of food demand.
Keywords: Gluten Politics Survey Food
Abstract: Despite a heightened political discourse surrounding food choices, few studies have identified connections between political beliefs and consumer perceptions. Using gluten as an example, this article identifies how political opinions relate to opinions of food products. If an avoidance of gluten is a biological condition and not a social construct, there should be no correlation between political opinions and gluten avoidance. Our study uncovers a complex relationship between the social construction of gluten avoidance and the potential role of political views. Perhaps most surprising, we find that supporters of Donald Trump are more likely to identify as avoiding gluten, relative to non-supporters. Findings suggest that future research might benefit from considering the political beliefs of consumers when estimating models of food demand.
Keywords: Gluten Politics Survey Food
From 2018... Overestimating democracy, despite its absence, is widespread in less developed countries with little or no democratic tradition; underestimating is common in mature, economically developed, Protestant democracies
From 2018... Democracy Confused: When People Mistake the Absence of Democracy for Its Presence. Stefan Kruse, Maria Ravlik, Christian Welzel. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, December 31, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022118821437
Abstract: A widely neglected phenomenon consists in the fact that large population segments in many countries confuse the absence of democracy with its presence. Significantly, these are also the countries where widespread support for democracy coexists with persistent deficiencies in the latter, including its outright absence. Addressing this puzzle, we introduce a framework to sort out to what extent national populations overestimate their regimes’ democratic qualities. We test our hypotheses applying multilevel models to about 93,000 individuals from 75 countries covered by the cross-cultural World Values Surveys. We find that overestimating democracy is a widespread phenomenon, although it varies systematically across countries. Among a multitude of plausible influences, cognitive stimuli and emancipative values work together as a psychologically activating force that turns people against overestimating democracy. In fact, this psychological activation not only reduces overestimations of democracy; it actually leads toward underestimations, thus increasing criticality rather than accuracy in assessments. We conclude that, by elevating normative expectations, psychological activation releases prodemocratic selection pressures in the evolution of regimes.
Keywords: cognitive mobilization, democracy assessments, emancipative values, political support, regime legitimacy
Abstract: A widely neglected phenomenon consists in the fact that large population segments in many countries confuse the absence of democracy with its presence. Significantly, these are also the countries where widespread support for democracy coexists with persistent deficiencies in the latter, including its outright absence. Addressing this puzzle, we introduce a framework to sort out to what extent national populations overestimate their regimes’ democratic qualities. We test our hypotheses applying multilevel models to about 93,000 individuals from 75 countries covered by the cross-cultural World Values Surveys. We find that overestimating democracy is a widespread phenomenon, although it varies systematically across countries. Among a multitude of plausible influences, cognitive stimuli and emancipative values work together as a psychologically activating force that turns people against overestimating democracy. In fact, this psychological activation not only reduces overestimations of democracy; it actually leads toward underestimations, thus increasing criticality rather than accuracy in assessments. We conclude that, by elevating normative expectations, psychological activation releases prodemocratic selection pressures in the evolution of regimes.
Keywords: cognitive mobilization, democracy assessments, emancipative values, political support, regime legitimacy
Cross-Cultural Variations in Extreme Rejecting and Extreme Affirming Response Styles
Cross-Cultural Variations in Extreme Rejecting and Extreme Affirming Response Styles. Tieyuan Guo, Roy Spina. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, September 9, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022119873072
Abstract: Previous research has discussed cultural differences in moderacy vs extremity response styles. The present research found that cultural differences in response styles were more complex than previously speculated. We investigated cross-cultural variations in extreme rejecting versus affirming response biases. Although research has indicated that overall Chinese have less extreme responses than Westerners, the difference may be mainly driven by extreme rejecting responses because respondents consider answering survey questions as a way of interacting with researchers, and extreme rejecting responses may disrupt harmony in relationships, which is valued more in Chinese collectivistic culture than in Western individualistic cultures. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that Chinese had less extreme rejecting response style than did British, whereas they did not differ in extreme affirming response style. Study 2 further revealed that the cross-cultural asymmetry in extreme rejecting versus affirming response styles was partially accounted for by individualism orientation at the individual level. Consistently, Study 3 revealed that at the country level, individualism was positively associated with extreme rejecting response style, but was not associated with extreme affirming response style, suggesting that individualism accounted for the asymmetric cultural variation in extreme rejecting versus affirming response styles.
Keywords: culture, extremity response style, extreme rejecting response style, extreme affirming response style, individualism
Abstract: Previous research has discussed cultural differences in moderacy vs extremity response styles. The present research found that cultural differences in response styles were more complex than previously speculated. We investigated cross-cultural variations in extreme rejecting versus affirming response biases. Although research has indicated that overall Chinese have less extreme responses than Westerners, the difference may be mainly driven by extreme rejecting responses because respondents consider answering survey questions as a way of interacting with researchers, and extreme rejecting responses may disrupt harmony in relationships, which is valued more in Chinese collectivistic culture than in Western individualistic cultures. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that Chinese had less extreme rejecting response style than did British, whereas they did not differ in extreme affirming response style. Study 2 further revealed that the cross-cultural asymmetry in extreme rejecting versus affirming response styles was partially accounted for by individualism orientation at the individual level. Consistently, Study 3 revealed that at the country level, individualism was positively associated with extreme rejecting response style, but was not associated with extreme affirming response style, suggesting that individualism accounted for the asymmetric cultural variation in extreme rejecting versus affirming response styles.
Keywords: culture, extremity response style, extreme rejecting response style, extreme affirming response style, individualism
From 1972... Erving Goffman's Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order
Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order. Erving Goffman. Penguin, 1972. ISBN-13 978-0140216141
Editor text:
Excerpt:
Editor text:
Until recently, to be in a "public place" meant to feel safe. That has changed, especially in cities. Urban dwellers sense the need to quickly react to gestural cues from persons in their immediate presence in order to establish their relationship to each other. Through this communication they hope to detect potential danger before it is too late for self-defense or flight. The ability to read accurately the "informing signs" by which strangers indicate their relationship to one another in public or semi-public places without speaking, has become as important as understanding the official written and spoken language of the country.
In Relations in Public, Erving Goff man provides a grammar of the unspoken language used in public places. He shows that the way strangers relate in public is part of a design by which friends and acquaintances manage their relationship in the presence of bystanders. He argues that, taken together, this forms part of a new domain of inquiry into the rules for co-mingling, or public order.
Most people give little thought to how elaborate and complex our everyday behavior in public actually is. For example, we adhere to the rules of pedestrian traffic on a busy thoroughfare, accept the usual ways of acting in a crowded elevator or subway car, grasp the delicate nuances of conversational behavior, and respond to the rich vocabulary of body gestures. We behave differently at weddings, at meals, in crowds, in couples, and when alone. Such everyday behavior, though generally below the level of awareness, embodies unspoken codes of social understandings necessary for the orderly conduct of society.
Excerpt:
p 32: "All of this may be seen in miniature in elevator behavior. Passengers have two problems: to allocate the space equably, and to maintain a defensible position, which in this context means orientation to the door and center with the back up against the wall if possible. The first few individuals can enter without anyone present having to rearrange himself, but very shortly each new entrant – up to a certain number – causes all those present to shift position and reorient themselves in sequence. Leave-taking introduces a tendency to reverse the cycle, but this is tempered by the countervailing resistance to appearing uncomfortable in an established distance from another. Thus, as the car empties, passengers acquire a measure of uneasiness, caught between two opposing inclinations – to obtain maximum distance from others and to inhibit avoidance behavior that might give offense."
p 31: "(when the two are of opposite sex, there exists the added complication that failure to move away when possible can be taken as a sign of undue interest.)"
Sunday, September 29, 2019
3G Internet reduces government approval and increases the perception of corruption in government when the internet is not censored; effect is stronger when traditional media is censored
Guriev, Sergei and Melnikov, Nikita and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 3G Internet and Confidence in Government (June 30, 2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456747
Abstract: How does the internet affect government approval? Using surveys of 840,537 individuals from 2,232 subnational regions in 116 countries in 2008-2017 from the Gallup World Poll and the global expansion of 3G networks, we show that an increase in internet access reduces government approval and increases the perception of corruption in government. This effect is present only when the internet is not censored and is stronger when traditional media is censored. Actual incidents of corruption translate into higher corruption perception only in places covered by 3G. In Europe, the expansion of mobile internet increased vote shares of anti-establishment populist parties.
Abstract: How does the internet affect government approval? Using surveys of 840,537 individuals from 2,232 subnational regions in 116 countries in 2008-2017 from the Gallup World Poll and the global expansion of 3G networks, we show that an increase in internet access reduces government approval and increases the perception of corruption in government. This effect is present only when the internet is not censored and is stronger when traditional media is censored. Actual incidents of corruption translate into higher corruption perception only in places covered by 3G. In Europe, the expansion of mobile internet increased vote shares of anti-establishment populist parties.
Binge drinking as a costly sexual signal (the drinker is capable of bearing the harmful consequences of alcohol consumption): Having more eligible men in a district compared to women was associated with higher male drinking rates
Operational Sex Ratio Predicts Binge Drinking Across U.S. Counties. Toe Aung et al. Evolutionary Psychology, September 29, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919874680
Abstract: Previous research suggests that binge drinking among young men serves as a “costly signal” to potential mates, such that the binge drinker is capable of bearing the harmful consequences of alcohol consumption. Here, we propose that binge drinking among young adults is conditionally dependent upon the signaler’s willingness to take risks, which is influenced by the local operational sex ratio (OSR). Using archived binge drinking estimates from 2009 to 2012 and Census Bureau records of OSRs, we tested the relationship between OSR and binge drinking rates at the county level across 3,143 U.S. counties against hypotheses drawn from evolutionary theory. Results from our mixed-effects models revealed that a higher overall OSR (i.e., more eligible men compared to women) was associated with higher male binge drinking rates but lower female binge drinking rates. A higher OSR particularly in the 20–29 and 50+ age groups predicted higher male binge drinking rates but lower female binge drinking rates. Our findings generally support predictions derived from evolutionary theory and suggest that binge drinking may function as a costly sexual signal, conditionally regulated by age and the local sex ratio.
Keywords: costly signaling, binge drinking, sex ratio, operational sex ratio, sexual signaling, young adults, alcohol consumption, risk-taking behavior, drinking
Abstract: Previous research suggests that binge drinking among young men serves as a “costly signal” to potential mates, such that the binge drinker is capable of bearing the harmful consequences of alcohol consumption. Here, we propose that binge drinking among young adults is conditionally dependent upon the signaler’s willingness to take risks, which is influenced by the local operational sex ratio (OSR). Using archived binge drinking estimates from 2009 to 2012 and Census Bureau records of OSRs, we tested the relationship between OSR and binge drinking rates at the county level across 3,143 U.S. counties against hypotheses drawn from evolutionary theory. Results from our mixed-effects models revealed that a higher overall OSR (i.e., more eligible men compared to women) was associated with higher male binge drinking rates but lower female binge drinking rates. A higher OSR particularly in the 20–29 and 50+ age groups predicted higher male binge drinking rates but lower female binge drinking rates. Our findings generally support predictions derived from evolutionary theory and suggest that binge drinking may function as a costly sexual signal, conditionally regulated by age and the local sex ratio.
Keywords: costly signaling, binge drinking, sex ratio, operational sex ratio, sexual signaling, young adults, alcohol consumption, risk-taking behavior, drinking
Rebellious music genres (rap, punk & heavy metal) are not linked to maladaptive personality traits; conservative music (country, gospel) was weakly linked to neurotic, hostile, & eccentric tendencies
Maladaptive personality and psychopathy dimensions as predictors of music and movie preferences in US adults. Pavel S Blagov et al. Psychology of Music, August 13, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305735619864630
Abstract: We link modern conceptualizations of maladaptive personality and psychopathy dimensions to music and movie genre preferences. Participants, N = 379, completed the Personality Inventory (5th ed.; PID-5), Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM), and music and movie preferences questionnaires. The structure of some, but not all, music preferences factors aligned with previous reports. Overall, maladaptive traits had meaningful, albeit modest links to entertainment media preferences, but not to the kinds of intense or rebellious music genres sometimes labeled as “problem” entertainment in prior literature. Support emerged for several a priori hypotheses, but some predictions based on the three- and five-factor normal personality trait and entertainment preferences literature did not generalize to a five-factor formulation of maladaptive personality. We discuss the findings’ implications and several likely sources of inconsistencies in the literature on music and movie preferences and personality.
Keywords: clinical issues, everyday life, genre, individual differences, personality
Abstract: We link modern conceptualizations of maladaptive personality and psychopathy dimensions to music and movie genre preferences. Participants, N = 379, completed the Personality Inventory (5th ed.; PID-5), Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM), and music and movie preferences questionnaires. The structure of some, but not all, music preferences factors aligned with previous reports. Overall, maladaptive traits had meaningful, albeit modest links to entertainment media preferences, but not to the kinds of intense or rebellious music genres sometimes labeled as “problem” entertainment in prior literature. Support emerged for several a priori hypotheses, but some predictions based on the three- and five-factor normal personality trait and entertainment preferences literature did not generalize to a five-factor formulation of maladaptive personality. We discuss the findings’ implications and several likely sources of inconsistencies in the literature on music and movie preferences and personality.
Keywords: clinical issues, everyday life, genre, individual differences, personality
Alcohol by night: People were motivated to preload to save money & socialise, were likely to drink more than they predicted, & were more surprised by their alcohol reading the more they drank
Drinking to go out or going out to drink? A longitudinal study of alcohol in night-time entertainment districts. Grant J. Devilly et al. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, September 29 2019, 107603. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2019.107603
Highlights
• End of night intoxication is predicted by beginning of night intoxication.
• Personality and demographics differentially predict drinking for males and females.
• People drink more than they anticipate within night time entertainment districts.
• Drinkers are surprised by the degree of their intoxication the more they drink.
Abstract
Background: Recent research has highlighted the growing trend of alcohol preloading before a night out. We wished to look at people’s motivations for preloading, their estimation for drinking during the night, and assess the impact that preloading has on how inebriated people become across the night as measured by Breath Approximated blood Alcohol Content (BrAC).
Method: We randomly surveyed and breath-tested patrons as they entered and exited Night Time Entertainment Districts (NEDs) in Brisbane, Queensland. We obtained 360 participants who were encouraged to contact us at the end of their night, compensating them for their time with a taxi voucher. Of these, 143 people returned and completed an exit questionnaire.
Findings: We found that people were motivated to preload in order to save money and socialise, were likely to drink more than they predicted over the course of the night, and were more surprised by their alcohol reading the higher their BrAC; this trajectory displayed little difference between men and women. It was further found that, for men, personality contributed 19% of the variance to exit BrAC, but entry BrAC accounted for nearly 38% of unique variance. For women, body mass index significantly predicted exit BrAC (9% unique variance), but entry BrAC accounted for nearly 30% unique variance.
Interpretation: To reduce general levels of intoxication in city NEDs, interventions should focus on having people come in earlier, less drunk, and be taught to have more realistic appraisals of their drinking.
Keywords: Alcohol UseNight-Time Entertainment DistrictsPreloadingEnd-of-NightLongitudinal StudyLegislation
Highlights
• End of night intoxication is predicted by beginning of night intoxication.
• Personality and demographics differentially predict drinking for males and females.
• People drink more than they anticipate within night time entertainment districts.
• Drinkers are surprised by the degree of their intoxication the more they drink.
Abstract
Background: Recent research has highlighted the growing trend of alcohol preloading before a night out. We wished to look at people’s motivations for preloading, their estimation for drinking during the night, and assess the impact that preloading has on how inebriated people become across the night as measured by Breath Approximated blood Alcohol Content (BrAC).
Method: We randomly surveyed and breath-tested patrons as they entered and exited Night Time Entertainment Districts (NEDs) in Brisbane, Queensland. We obtained 360 participants who were encouraged to contact us at the end of their night, compensating them for their time with a taxi voucher. Of these, 143 people returned and completed an exit questionnaire.
Findings: We found that people were motivated to preload in order to save money and socialise, were likely to drink more than they predicted over the course of the night, and were more surprised by their alcohol reading the higher their BrAC; this trajectory displayed little difference between men and women. It was further found that, for men, personality contributed 19% of the variance to exit BrAC, but entry BrAC accounted for nearly 38% of unique variance. For women, body mass index significantly predicted exit BrAC (9% unique variance), but entry BrAC accounted for nearly 30% unique variance.
Interpretation: To reduce general levels of intoxication in city NEDs, interventions should focus on having people come in earlier, less drunk, and be taught to have more realistic appraisals of their drinking.
Keywords: Alcohol UseNight-Time Entertainment DistrictsPreloadingEnd-of-NightLongitudinal StudyLegislation
The roots of intolerance and opposition to compromise: The effects of absolutism on political attitudes
The roots of intolerance and opposition to compromise: The effects of absolutism on political attitudes. Kevin Arceneaux. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 151, December 1 2019, 109498. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.07.008
Abstract: Compromise and tolerance are often considered to be virtues, especially in the realm of democratic politics. Without them, it would be difficult for democratic institutions to fulfill their intended purpose: resolving disputes peacefully. Yet many controversial political issues reduce to moral imperatives that engender strong, uncompromising opinions. There is a tendency to conceptualize moralizing as an aspect of issues, but considerable evidence suggests that the tendency to think about the world in absolutist terms is also a psychological predisposition. In this project, I seek to elaborate the correlates and consequences of individual differences in absolutism. A suite of observational analyses and an experimental test conforms that there is a great deal of variance in ethical predispositions across individuals and that these differences matter politically. Absolutists are more likely to adopt extreme opinions, display intolerance toward political disagreement, and punish politicians who make compromises.
Abstract: Compromise and tolerance are often considered to be virtues, especially in the realm of democratic politics. Without them, it would be difficult for democratic institutions to fulfill their intended purpose: resolving disputes peacefully. Yet many controversial political issues reduce to moral imperatives that engender strong, uncompromising opinions. There is a tendency to conceptualize moralizing as an aspect of issues, but considerable evidence suggests that the tendency to think about the world in absolutist terms is also a psychological predisposition. In this project, I seek to elaborate the correlates and consequences of individual differences in absolutism. A suite of observational analyses and an experimental test conforms that there is a great deal of variance in ethical predispositions across individuals and that these differences matter politically. Absolutists are more likely to adopt extreme opinions, display intolerance toward political disagreement, and punish politicians who make compromises.
James Hankins' Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy
Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy. James Hankins. Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, Dec 2019.
https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Politics-Soulcraft-Statecraft-Renaissance/dp/0674237552
Convulsed by a civilizational crisis, the great thinkers of the Renaissance set out to reconceive the nature of society. Everywhere they saw problems. Corrupt and reckless tyrants sowing discord and ruling through fear; elites who prized wealth and status over the common good; military leaders waging endless wars. Their solution was at once simple and radical. “Men, not walls, make a city,” as Thucydides so memorably said. They would rebuild their city, and their civilization, by transforming the moral character of its citizens. Soulcraft, they believed, was a precondition of successful statecraft.
A dazzlingly ambitious reappraisal of Renaissance political thought by one of our generation’s foremost intellectual historians, Virtue Politics challenges the traditional narrative that looks to the Renaissance as the seedbed of modern republicanism and sees Machiavelli as its exemplary thinker. James Hankins reveals that what most concerned the humanists was not reforming laws or institutions so much as shaping citizens. If character mattered more than constitutions, it would have to be nurtured through a new program of education they called the studia humanitatis: the humanities.
We owe liberal arts education and much else besides to the bold experiment of these passionate and principled thinkers. The questions they asked―Should a good man serve a corrupt regime? What virtues are necessary in a leader? What is the source of political legitimacy? Is wealth concentration detrimental to social cohesion? Should citizens be expected to fight for their country?―would have a profound impact on later debates about good government and seem as vital today as they did then.
Tyler Cowen excerpts (Sep 29 2019, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/09/virtue-politics.html):
I have sought to present the political ideas of the humanists as the expression of a movement of thought and action, similar in its physiognomy if not in its content to the movement of the philosophes of the Enlightenment. It was a movement that was stimulated by a crisis of legitimacy in late medieval Italy and by widespread disgust with its political and religious leadership. Its adherents were men who had wide experience -- often bitter, personal experience -- with tyranny. They knew that oligarchs and even popular governments could be as tyrannical as princes. Their movement was largely in agreement about its goals: to rebuild Europe's depleted reserves of good character, true piety, and practical wisdom. They also agreed widely about means: the revival of classical antiquity, which the humanists presented as an inspiring pageant, rich in examples of noble conduct, eloquent speech, selfless dedication to country, and inner moral strength, nourished by philosophy and uncorrupt Christianity. The humanist movement yearned after greatness, moral and political. Its most pressing historical questions were how ancient Rome had achieved her vast and enduring empire, and whether it was possible to bring that greatness to life again under modern conditions. This led to the question of whether it was the Roman Republic or the Principate that should be emulated; and, once the humanists had learned Greek, it provoked the further question of whether Rome was the only possible ancient model to emulate, or whether Athens or Sparta, or even the Persia of Xenophon's Cyrus, held lessons for contemporary statesmen.
https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Politics-Soulcraft-Statecraft-Renaissance/dp/0674237552
Convulsed by a civilizational crisis, the great thinkers of the Renaissance set out to reconceive the nature of society. Everywhere they saw problems. Corrupt and reckless tyrants sowing discord and ruling through fear; elites who prized wealth and status over the common good; military leaders waging endless wars. Their solution was at once simple and radical. “Men, not walls, make a city,” as Thucydides so memorably said. They would rebuild their city, and their civilization, by transforming the moral character of its citizens. Soulcraft, they believed, was a precondition of successful statecraft.
A dazzlingly ambitious reappraisal of Renaissance political thought by one of our generation’s foremost intellectual historians, Virtue Politics challenges the traditional narrative that looks to the Renaissance as the seedbed of modern republicanism and sees Machiavelli as its exemplary thinker. James Hankins reveals that what most concerned the humanists was not reforming laws or institutions so much as shaping citizens. If character mattered more than constitutions, it would have to be nurtured through a new program of education they called the studia humanitatis: the humanities.
We owe liberal arts education and much else besides to the bold experiment of these passionate and principled thinkers. The questions they asked―Should a good man serve a corrupt regime? What virtues are necessary in a leader? What is the source of political legitimacy? Is wealth concentration detrimental to social cohesion? Should citizens be expected to fight for their country?―would have a profound impact on later debates about good government and seem as vital today as they did then.
Tyler Cowen excerpts (Sep 29 2019, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/09/virtue-politics.html):
I have sought to present the political ideas of the humanists as the expression of a movement of thought and action, similar in its physiognomy if not in its content to the movement of the philosophes of the Enlightenment. It was a movement that was stimulated by a crisis of legitimacy in late medieval Italy and by widespread disgust with its political and religious leadership. Its adherents were men who had wide experience -- often bitter, personal experience -- with tyranny. They knew that oligarchs and even popular governments could be as tyrannical as princes. Their movement was largely in agreement about its goals: to rebuild Europe's depleted reserves of good character, true piety, and practical wisdom. They also agreed widely about means: the revival of classical antiquity, which the humanists presented as an inspiring pageant, rich in examples of noble conduct, eloquent speech, selfless dedication to country, and inner moral strength, nourished by philosophy and uncorrupt Christianity. The humanist movement yearned after greatness, moral and political. Its most pressing historical questions were how ancient Rome had achieved her vast and enduring empire, and whether it was possible to bring that greatness to life again under modern conditions. This led to the question of whether it was the Roman Republic or the Principate that should be emulated; and, once the humanists had learned Greek, it provoked the further question of whether Rome was the only possible ancient model to emulate, or whether Athens or Sparta, or even the Persia of Xenophon's Cyrus, held lessons for contemporary statesmen.
Women & men want a partner that is funnier than themselves; only women want a partner that is also more trustworthy than they are; none want a partner more intelligent
From 2018... The Persistence of Established Dating Theories in a Real-Life Dyadic Blind Date Study. Yannick Nout, MSci Thesis, Applied Cognitive Psychology. Leiden Uni, Aug 2018. https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/71521/Nout%2C%20Yannick-s1507869-MA%20Thesis%20ACP-2018.pdf
Abstract: Mating is fundamental for reproduction and family life and the drive to mate stands high on the hierarchy of human needs. Consequently, there are many theories and concepts regarding dating. However, studies done on this topic are usually conducted in a laboratory setting, while dating normally occurs in much less controlled conditions. This study aimed to test if several established dating theories (partner preferences, Attractiveness Halo Effect, (nonverbal) communication and expressions, mimicry and physiological synchrony) hold up in a more realistic real-life dating experiment. This study was conducted at public events and combined questionnaires, behavioural expressions and physiological measures (eye tracking, heart rate, skin conductance). Participants (N = 140) were formed into opposite-sex dyads and interacted three times during their ‘date’ (first impression, verbal and nonverbal interaction). Many of our findings were in line with previous research. Partner preferences seem to be in line with research; the Attractiveness Halo Effect occurred; participants were not accurate in guessing if they were liked by their partner; submissive behaviour reflected liking, sexual attraction and attraction to some degree, however results regarding affiliative behaviour contradicted previous research; only female sexual attraction is affected by submissive and affiliative behaviour; there is evidence that mimicry occurs; physiological synchrony affected females’ opinions, male date outcome and date outcome match. These results suggest that most dating theories and concepts to a certain degree hold up in real-life contexts.
Keywords: dating, real-life, partner preferences, attractiveness halo effect, nonverbal communication, mimicry, physiological synchrony
Abstract: Mating is fundamental for reproduction and family life and the drive to mate stands high on the hierarchy of human needs. Consequently, there are many theories and concepts regarding dating. However, studies done on this topic are usually conducted in a laboratory setting, while dating normally occurs in much less controlled conditions. This study aimed to test if several established dating theories (partner preferences, Attractiveness Halo Effect, (nonverbal) communication and expressions, mimicry and physiological synchrony) hold up in a more realistic real-life dating experiment. This study was conducted at public events and combined questionnaires, behavioural expressions and physiological measures (eye tracking, heart rate, skin conductance). Participants (N = 140) were formed into opposite-sex dyads and interacted three times during their ‘date’ (first impression, verbal and nonverbal interaction). Many of our findings were in line with previous research. Partner preferences seem to be in line with research; the Attractiveness Halo Effect occurred; participants were not accurate in guessing if they were liked by their partner; submissive behaviour reflected liking, sexual attraction and attraction to some degree, however results regarding affiliative behaviour contradicted previous research; only female sexual attraction is affected by submissive and affiliative behaviour; there is evidence that mimicry occurs; physiological synchrony affected females’ opinions, male date outcome and date outcome match. These results suggest that most dating theories and concepts to a certain degree hold up in real-life contexts.
Keywords: dating, real-life, partner preferences, attractiveness halo effect, nonverbal communication, mimicry, physiological synchrony
Alan Blinder's influential estimate, 2007: 25pct more of U.S. jobs were at risk of being offshored; instead, more jobs were added than lost, against the scaremongering that millions would be lost
Report: Overboard on Offshore Fears. Adam Ozimek, chief economist at Upwork. Sep 27 2019. https://www.upwork.com/press/economics/report-overboard-on-offshore-fears/
In 2007 an economist predicted U.S. service sector jobs were at high risk of being offshored. Data now shows that instead they are going remote.
Executive Summary
Advancing technology is unlocking great potential in remote work opportunities by making it increasingly easy for work that used to be done in person to now be done remotely. Yet these changes have led some researchers to worry about the offshoring of U.S. jobs. In one influential estimate from 2007, economist Alan Blinder projected that a quarter or more of U.S. jobs were at risk of being offshored.
In this report, we take a look at the data from the decade-plus since this warning was issued and find that the techno-pessimism was misplaced. Instead of being offshored, the types of work predicted to be at risk of offshoring are increasingly being performed remotely by workers within the U.S. While technology may be giving firms the choice of hiring workers from around the globe, this is not translating to job loss. Instead, it’s leading to more U.S. workers enjoying the greater freedom, flexibility, and shorter commutes of remote work.
This analysis investigates the growth of remote work in the U.S. using Census Bureau data, unique surveys and data from Upwork, the largest online work website. The key results are as follows:
. Contrary to popular predictions made in 2007, offshoring risk is not related to job loss for hundreds of occupations.
. Instead, those jobs predicted as “at risk” of being offshored are significantly more remote work based today.
. Data from Upwork shows that U.S. knowledge workers retain a competitive advantage even in a global marketplace, and are in demand from both U.S. businesses and businesses around the world.
. Young business owners and hiring managers are more comfortable with remote work, and younger workers are more likely to want to work remotely, which suggests the remote work trend will continue to grow based on demographic change alone.
. Instead of focusing on how demand might shift overseas, research should consider how remote work could help shift demand within the U.S. to lower cost of living areas that are currently lacking in economic opportunity.
---
The White-Collar Job Apocalypse That Didn’t Happen. Ben Casselman. TNYT, Sep 27 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/economy/jobs-offshoring.html
In a follow-up paper released Friday, another economist, Adam Ozimek, revisited Mr. Blinder’s analysis to see what had happened over the past decade. Some job categories that Mr. Blinder identified as vulnerable [to offshoring], like data-entry workers, have seen a decline in United States employment. But the ranks of others, like actuaries, have continued to grow.
Over all, of the 26 occupations that Mr. Blinder identified as “highly offshorable” and for which Mr. Ozimek had data, 15 have added jobs over the past decade and 11 have cut them. Altogether, those occupations have eliminated fewer than 200,000 jobs over 10 years, hardly the millions that many feared. A second tier of jobs — which Mr. Blinder labeled “offshorable” — has actually added more than 1.5 million jobs.
But Mr. Blinder didn’t miss the mark entirely, said Mr. Ozimek, who is chief economist at Upwork, an online platform for hiring freelancers. The new study found that in the jobs that Mr. Blinder identified as easily offshored, a growing share of workers were now working from home. Mr. Ozimek said he suspected that many more were working in satellite offices or for outside contractors, rather than at a company’s main location. In other words, technology like cloud computing and videoconferencing has enabled these jobs to be done remotely, just not quite as remotely as Mr. Blinder and many others assumed.
In 2007 an economist predicted U.S. service sector jobs were at high risk of being offshored. Data now shows that instead they are going remote.
Executive Summary
Advancing technology is unlocking great potential in remote work opportunities by making it increasingly easy for work that used to be done in person to now be done remotely. Yet these changes have led some researchers to worry about the offshoring of U.S. jobs. In one influential estimate from 2007, economist Alan Blinder projected that a quarter or more of U.S. jobs were at risk of being offshored.
In this report, we take a look at the data from the decade-plus since this warning was issued and find that the techno-pessimism was misplaced. Instead of being offshored, the types of work predicted to be at risk of offshoring are increasingly being performed remotely by workers within the U.S. While technology may be giving firms the choice of hiring workers from around the globe, this is not translating to job loss. Instead, it’s leading to more U.S. workers enjoying the greater freedom, flexibility, and shorter commutes of remote work.
This analysis investigates the growth of remote work in the U.S. using Census Bureau data, unique surveys and data from Upwork, the largest online work website. The key results are as follows:
. Contrary to popular predictions made in 2007, offshoring risk is not related to job loss for hundreds of occupations.
. Instead, those jobs predicted as “at risk” of being offshored are significantly more remote work based today.
. Data from Upwork shows that U.S. knowledge workers retain a competitive advantage even in a global marketplace, and are in demand from both U.S. businesses and businesses around the world.
. Young business owners and hiring managers are more comfortable with remote work, and younger workers are more likely to want to work remotely, which suggests the remote work trend will continue to grow based on demographic change alone.
. Instead of focusing on how demand might shift overseas, research should consider how remote work could help shift demand within the U.S. to lower cost of living areas that are currently lacking in economic opportunity.
---
The White-Collar Job Apocalypse That Didn’t Happen. Ben Casselman. TNYT, Sep 27 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/economy/jobs-offshoring.html
In a follow-up paper released Friday, another economist, Adam Ozimek, revisited Mr. Blinder’s analysis to see what had happened over the past decade. Some job categories that Mr. Blinder identified as vulnerable [to offshoring], like data-entry workers, have seen a decline in United States employment. But the ranks of others, like actuaries, have continued to grow.
Over all, of the 26 occupations that Mr. Blinder identified as “highly offshorable” and for which Mr. Ozimek had data, 15 have added jobs over the past decade and 11 have cut them. Altogether, those occupations have eliminated fewer than 200,000 jobs over 10 years, hardly the millions that many feared. A second tier of jobs — which Mr. Blinder labeled “offshorable” — has actually added more than 1.5 million jobs.
But Mr. Blinder didn’t miss the mark entirely, said Mr. Ozimek, who is chief economist at Upwork, an online platform for hiring freelancers. The new study found that in the jobs that Mr. Blinder identified as easily offshored, a growing share of workers were now working from home. Mr. Ozimek said he suspected that many more were working in satellite offices or for outside contractors, rather than at a company’s main location. In other words, technology like cloud computing and videoconferencing has enabled these jobs to be done remotely, just not quite as remotely as Mr. Blinder and many others assumed.
Logic, Fast and Slow: The Persistent Difficulty of the Monty Hall Problem
Logic, Fast and Slow: The Persistent Difficulty of the Monty Hall Problem. Jay Kosegarten & Gary Kose. EvoS Journal, 2019, NEEPS XII, pp. 24-42. http://evostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Kosegarten-Kose_Vol10SpIss1.pdf
ABSTRACT: Evolutionary cognitive psychology is equipped to answer questions regarding not only human reasoning but also its limitations. Given that the field argues for naturally selected reasoning capacities (either broad or modular), the causes of certain cognitive errors and biases are of important interest. Kahneman (2011) has investigated and explicated the many fallacies in human logic that can lead people to make less than optimal judgments and decisions. Evolutionary cognitive psychologists have examined both probability judgments and conditional reasoning. Taken together, it would appear that evolutionary psychology could shed light on the notion that humans think both ‘fast and slow.’ This study examined two aspects of logical problem-solving hypothesized to be necessary for deducing the optimal response to the Monty Hall problem. The authors investigated the effects of a demonstration designed to emphasize the logic of the Monty Hall problem and to facilitate perspective-change, and the authors investigated the effects of counterfactual reasoning tasks. Alone, these two conditions—the demonstration and counterfactual reasoning—did not improve performance over controls. When combined, they did significantly improve subjects’ performance. We argue that subjects’ strong tendency to respond illogically to the Monty Hall problem is an example of fast, System 1 thinking and that the combined cognitive influences of a logical demonstration and counterfactual reasoning facilitated slow, System 2 thinking. Further we argue that slow, System 2 thinking operates with two subsystems called ‘fast logic’ and ‘slow logic.’
KEYWORDS: Problem-Solving, Probabilistic Reasoning, Logic
Check also... Saenen, L. et al., (2018). Why Humans Fail in Solving the Monty Hall Dilemma: A Systematic Review. Psychologica Belgica, 58 (1), pp . 128–158. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/06/why-humans-fail-in-solving-monty-hall.html
ABSTRACT: Evolutionary cognitive psychology is equipped to answer questions regarding not only human reasoning but also its limitations. Given that the field argues for naturally selected reasoning capacities (either broad or modular), the causes of certain cognitive errors and biases are of important interest. Kahneman (2011) has investigated and explicated the many fallacies in human logic that can lead people to make less than optimal judgments and decisions. Evolutionary cognitive psychologists have examined both probability judgments and conditional reasoning. Taken together, it would appear that evolutionary psychology could shed light on the notion that humans think both ‘fast and slow.’ This study examined two aspects of logical problem-solving hypothesized to be necessary for deducing the optimal response to the Monty Hall problem. The authors investigated the effects of a demonstration designed to emphasize the logic of the Monty Hall problem and to facilitate perspective-change, and the authors investigated the effects of counterfactual reasoning tasks. Alone, these two conditions—the demonstration and counterfactual reasoning—did not improve performance over controls. When combined, they did significantly improve subjects’ performance. We argue that subjects’ strong tendency to respond illogically to the Monty Hall problem is an example of fast, System 1 thinking and that the combined cognitive influences of a logical demonstration and counterfactual reasoning facilitated slow, System 2 thinking. Further we argue that slow, System 2 thinking operates with two subsystems called ‘fast logic’ and ‘slow logic.’
KEYWORDS: Problem-Solving, Probabilistic Reasoning, Logic
Check also... Saenen, L. et al., (2018). Why Humans Fail in Solving the Monty Hall Dilemma: A Systematic Review. Psychologica Belgica, 58 (1), pp . 128–158. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/06/why-humans-fail-in-solving-monty-hall.html
Saturday, September 28, 2019
Italy: 75% of immigrants integrate into the majoritarian culture over a generation; interestingly, a lower cultural intolerance of Italians towards minorities would lead to slower cultural integration
Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy. Alberto Bisin, Giulia Tura. NBER Working Paper No. 26303, September 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26303
We study the cultural integration of immigrants, estimating a structural model of marital matching along ethnic dimensions, exploring in detail the role of fertility, and possibly divorce in the integration process. We exploit rich administrative demographic data on the universe of marriages formed in Italy, as well as birth and separation records from 1995 to 2012. We estimate strong preferences of ethnic minorities' towards socialization of children to their own identity, identifying marital selection and fertility choices as fundamental socialization mechanisms. The estimated cultural intolerance of Italians towards immigrant minorities is also substantial. Turning to long-run simulations, we find that cultural intolerances, as well as fertility and homogamy rates, slow-down the cultural integration of some immigrant ethnic minorities, especially Latin America, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, 75% of immigrants integrate into the majoritarian culture over the period of a generation. Interestingly, we show by counterfactual analysis that a lower cultural intolerance of Italians towards minorities would lead to slower cultural integration by allowing immigrants a more widespread use of their own language rather than Italian in heterogamous marriages. Finally, we quantitatively assess the effects of large future immigration inflows.
We study the cultural integration of immigrants, estimating a structural model of marital matching along ethnic dimensions, exploring in detail the role of fertility, and possibly divorce in the integration process. We exploit rich administrative demographic data on the universe of marriages formed in Italy, as well as birth and separation records from 1995 to 2012. We estimate strong preferences of ethnic minorities' towards socialization of children to their own identity, identifying marital selection and fertility choices as fundamental socialization mechanisms. The estimated cultural intolerance of Italians towards immigrant minorities is also substantial. Turning to long-run simulations, we find that cultural intolerances, as well as fertility and homogamy rates, slow-down the cultural integration of some immigrant ethnic minorities, especially Latin America, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, 75% of immigrants integrate into the majoritarian culture over the period of a generation. Interestingly, we show by counterfactual analysis that a lower cultural intolerance of Italians towards minorities would lead to slower cultural integration by allowing immigrants a more widespread use of their own language rather than Italian in heterogamous marriages. Finally, we quantitatively assess the effects of large future immigration inflows.
Women & men perception of breasts: The bigger, the higher the reproductive efficiency, lactational efficiency, sexual desire, promiscuity attributed; & perceived as less faithful & less intelligent
Stereotypical and Actual Associations of Breast Size with Mating-Relevant Traits. Krzysztof Kościński, Rafał Makarewicz, Zbigniew Bartoszewicz. Archives of Sexual Behavior, September 27 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-019-1464-z
Abstract: Breast size varies substantially among women and influences perception of the woman by other people with regard to her attractiveness and other characteristics that are important in social contexts, including mating. The theory of sexual selection predicts that physical criteria of partner selection should be markers of the candidate’s desirable properties, mainly biological quality. Few studies, however, have examined whether breast size really signals biological quality or its components and whether observers accurately interpret these signals. Our first study encompassed 163 young women and aimed to establish actual correlates of breast size. The aim of the second study was to determine preferences and stereotypes related to breast size: 252–265 women and men evaluated female digital figures varying in, among other characteristics, breast size. Breast size (breast circumference minus chest circumference) was negatively associated with body asymmetry and positively associated with infections of the respiratory system, but did not correlate with infections of the digestive system, openness to casual sex, and testosterone and estradiol level. Women and men perceived breasts in a similar way to each other: the bigger the breasts the higher the reproductive efficiency, lactational efficiency, sexual desire, and promiscuity attributed to the woman. Nevertheless, large breasts were not regarded more attractive than average ones, though small breasts were the least attractive. In addition, big-breasted women were perceived as less faithful and less intelligent than women with average or small breasts. We discuss our results from the perspectives of evolutionary psychology, perceptual biases, and social stereotypes.
Keywords: Breast size Physical attractiveness Sexual selection Biological signal Social perception
Abstract: Breast size varies substantially among women and influences perception of the woman by other people with regard to her attractiveness and other characteristics that are important in social contexts, including mating. The theory of sexual selection predicts that physical criteria of partner selection should be markers of the candidate’s desirable properties, mainly biological quality. Few studies, however, have examined whether breast size really signals biological quality or its components and whether observers accurately interpret these signals. Our first study encompassed 163 young women and aimed to establish actual correlates of breast size. The aim of the second study was to determine preferences and stereotypes related to breast size: 252–265 women and men evaluated female digital figures varying in, among other characteristics, breast size. Breast size (breast circumference minus chest circumference) was negatively associated with body asymmetry and positively associated with infections of the respiratory system, but did not correlate with infections of the digestive system, openness to casual sex, and testosterone and estradiol level. Women and men perceived breasts in a similar way to each other: the bigger the breasts the higher the reproductive efficiency, lactational efficiency, sexual desire, and promiscuity attributed to the woman. Nevertheless, large breasts were not regarded more attractive than average ones, though small breasts were the least attractive. In addition, big-breasted women were perceived as less faithful and less intelligent than women with average or small breasts. We discuss our results from the perspectives of evolutionary psychology, perceptual biases, and social stereotypes.
Keywords: Breast size Physical attractiveness Sexual selection Biological signal Social perception
A mindset of optimism is associated with lower cardiovascular risk and that promotion of optimism and reduction in pessimism may be important for preventive health
Association of Optimism With Cardiovascular Events and All-Cause Mortality - A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis. Alan Rozanski et al. JAMA Netw Open. 2019;2(9):e1912200. September 27, 2019. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.12200
Key Points
Question Is a mindset of optimism associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality?
Findings In this meta-analysis of 15 studies including 229 391 individuals, optimism was associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular events and pessimism was associated with a higher risk of cardiovascular events; the pooled association was similar to that of other well-established cardiac risk factors.
Meaning The findings suggest that a mindset of optimism is associated with lower cardiovascular risk and that promotion of optimism and reduction in pessimism may be important for preventive health.
Abstract
Importance Optimism and pessimism can be easily measured and are potentially modifiable mindsets that may be associated with cardiovascular risk and all-cause mortality.
Objective To conduct a meta-analysis and systematic review of the association between optimism and risk for future cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality.
Data Sources and Study Selection PubMed, Scopus, and PsycINFO electronic databases were systematically searched from inception through July 2, 2019, to identify all cohort studies investigating the association between optimism and pessimism and cardiovascular events and/or all-cause mortality by using the following Medical Subject Heading terms: optimism, optimistic explanatory style, pessimism, outcomes, endpoint, mortality, death, cardiovascular events, stroke, coronary artery disease, coronary heart disease, ischemic heart disease, and cardiovascular disease.
Data Extraction and Synthesis Data were screened and extracted independently by 2 investigators (A.R. and C.B.). Adjusted effect estimates were used, and pooled analysis was performed using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman random-effects model. Sensitivity and subgroup analyses were performed to assess the robustness of the findings. The Meta-analysis of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (MOOSE) reporting guideline was followed.
Main Outcomes and Measures Cardiovascular events included a composite of fatal cardiovascular mortality, nonfatal myocardial infarction, stroke, and/or new-onset angina. All-cause mortality was assessed as a separate outcome.
Results The search yielded 15 studies comprising 229 391 participants of which 10 studies reported data on cardiovascular events and 9 studies reported data on all-cause mortality. The mean follow-up period was 13.8 years (range, 2-40 years). On pooled analysis, optimism was significantly associated with a decreased risk of cardiovascular events (relative risk, 0.65; 95% CI, 0.51-0.78; P < .001), with high heterogeneity in the analysis (I2 = 87.4%). Similarly, optimism was significantly associated with a lower risk of all-cause mortality (relative risk, 0.86; 95% CI, 0.80-0.92; P < .001), with moderate heterogeneity (I2 = 73.2%). Subgroup analyses by methods for assessment, follow-up duration, sex, and adjustment for depression and other potential confounders yielded similar results.
Conclusions and Relevance The findings suggest that optimism is associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality. Future studies should seek to better define the biobehavioral mechanisms underlying this association and evaluate the potential benefit of interventions designed to promote optimism or reduce pessimism.
Introduction
Extensive evidence has demonstrated an association between negative emotions, social factors, and certain chronic stress conditions and adverse cardiac outcomes.1 Less well studied has been the potential association between positive and negative mindsets and cardiac risk. Such research is of interest because mind-sets are potentially modifiable, thus making them a novel relevant target for clinical intervention. One such mindset is an individual’s level of optimism, commonly defined as the tendency to think that good things will happen in the future.2 Empirical studies have long indicated that more optimistic individuals are more likely to succeed at work and in school, sports, politics, relationships, and other forms of life endeavors.3,4 A more recent study also reported positive associations between optimism and a range of favorable physical health outcomes.5 Nevertheless, the assessment of optimism and pessimism in cardiac medical practice is uncommon. In 2001, Kubzansky and colleagues6 reported the first study, to our knowledge, to find an association between higher optimism and a lower risk for specific cardiac outcomes, including angina, myocardial infarction, and cardiac death. They showed effects of optimism beyond those of depression or other forms of psychological distress, a critical finding because a concern about such findings is that they simply reflect the absence of depression rather than active effects of optimism. Since then, similar findings have been described in other studies,7-20 and most studies considered depression or distress as a potential confounder. To consider these findings more systematically, we conducted a meta-analysis of studies that have assessed the association between optimism and pessimism and adverse cardiac outcomes. Our goals were to evaluate the magnitude of this association, the consistency of results among reported studies, the influence of potential confounders, and the quality of the reported literature.
Key Points
Question Is a mindset of optimism associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality?
Findings In this meta-analysis of 15 studies including 229 391 individuals, optimism was associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular events and pessimism was associated with a higher risk of cardiovascular events; the pooled association was similar to that of other well-established cardiac risk factors.
Meaning The findings suggest that a mindset of optimism is associated with lower cardiovascular risk and that promotion of optimism and reduction in pessimism may be important for preventive health.
Abstract
Importance Optimism and pessimism can be easily measured and are potentially modifiable mindsets that may be associated with cardiovascular risk and all-cause mortality.
Objective To conduct a meta-analysis and systematic review of the association between optimism and risk for future cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality.
Data Sources and Study Selection PubMed, Scopus, and PsycINFO electronic databases were systematically searched from inception through July 2, 2019, to identify all cohort studies investigating the association between optimism and pessimism and cardiovascular events and/or all-cause mortality by using the following Medical Subject Heading terms: optimism, optimistic explanatory style, pessimism, outcomes, endpoint, mortality, death, cardiovascular events, stroke, coronary artery disease, coronary heart disease, ischemic heart disease, and cardiovascular disease.
Data Extraction and Synthesis Data were screened and extracted independently by 2 investigators (A.R. and C.B.). Adjusted effect estimates were used, and pooled analysis was performed using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman random-effects model. Sensitivity and subgroup analyses were performed to assess the robustness of the findings. The Meta-analysis of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (MOOSE) reporting guideline was followed.
Main Outcomes and Measures Cardiovascular events included a composite of fatal cardiovascular mortality, nonfatal myocardial infarction, stroke, and/or new-onset angina. All-cause mortality was assessed as a separate outcome.
Results The search yielded 15 studies comprising 229 391 participants of which 10 studies reported data on cardiovascular events and 9 studies reported data on all-cause mortality. The mean follow-up period was 13.8 years (range, 2-40 years). On pooled analysis, optimism was significantly associated with a decreased risk of cardiovascular events (relative risk, 0.65; 95% CI, 0.51-0.78; P < .001), with high heterogeneity in the analysis (I2 = 87.4%). Similarly, optimism was significantly associated with a lower risk of all-cause mortality (relative risk, 0.86; 95% CI, 0.80-0.92; P < .001), with moderate heterogeneity (I2 = 73.2%). Subgroup analyses by methods for assessment, follow-up duration, sex, and adjustment for depression and other potential confounders yielded similar results.
Conclusions and Relevance The findings suggest that optimism is associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular events and all-cause mortality. Future studies should seek to better define the biobehavioral mechanisms underlying this association and evaluate the potential benefit of interventions designed to promote optimism or reduce pessimism.
Introduction
Extensive evidence has demonstrated an association between negative emotions, social factors, and certain chronic stress conditions and adverse cardiac outcomes.1 Less well studied has been the potential association between positive and negative mindsets and cardiac risk. Such research is of interest because mind-sets are potentially modifiable, thus making them a novel relevant target for clinical intervention. One such mindset is an individual’s level of optimism, commonly defined as the tendency to think that good things will happen in the future.2 Empirical studies have long indicated that more optimistic individuals are more likely to succeed at work and in school, sports, politics, relationships, and other forms of life endeavors.3,4 A more recent study also reported positive associations between optimism and a range of favorable physical health outcomes.5 Nevertheless, the assessment of optimism and pessimism in cardiac medical practice is uncommon. In 2001, Kubzansky and colleagues6 reported the first study, to our knowledge, to find an association between higher optimism and a lower risk for specific cardiac outcomes, including angina, myocardial infarction, and cardiac death. They showed effects of optimism beyond those of depression or other forms of psychological distress, a critical finding because a concern about such findings is that they simply reflect the absence of depression rather than active effects of optimism. Since then, similar findings have been described in other studies,7-20 and most studies considered depression or distress as a potential confounder. To consider these findings more systematically, we conducted a meta-analysis of studies that have assessed the association between optimism and pessimism and adverse cardiac outcomes. Our goals were to evaluate the magnitude of this association, the consistency of results among reported studies, the influence of potential confounders, and the quality of the reported literature.
Vegetarian diets may be perceived as inadequately nutritious, inadequately tasty, socially stigmatizing, too expensive, unfamiliar, inconvenient; dominant factors are the two first
Taste and health concerns trump anticipated stigma as barriers to vegetarianism. Daniel L.Rosenfeld, A. JanetTomiyama. Appetite, Volume 144, January 1 2020, 104469. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2019.104469
Abstract: Meat-eaters report that a number of barriers inhibit them from going vegetarian—for example, perceiving vegetarian diets to be inadequately nutritious, too expensive, unfamiliar, inconvenient, inadequately tasty, and socially stigmatizing. However, research identifying which barriers uniquely predict meat-eaters’ openness to going vegetarian is lacking from the current literature. In the present research, accordingly, we conducted a highly powered, preregistered study (N = 579) to identify which barriers uniquely predict openness to going vegetarian. We focused specifically on anticipated vegetarian stigma, given recent qualitative evidence highlighting this attitude as an influential barrier. That is, do meat-eaters resist going vegetarian because they fear that following a vegetarian diet would make them feel stigmatized? Being of younger age, more politically conservative, White, and residing in a rural community predicted greater anticipated vegetarian stigma among meat-eaters. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses converged, however, to suggest that anticipated vegetarian stigma was not a significant predictor of openness to going vegetarian. The strongest predictors of openness were perceived tastiness and perceived healthfulness of vegetarian dieting. These factors—but not anticipated stigma—furthermore explained why men (compared to women) and political conservatives (compared to liberals) were particularly resistant to going vegetarian.
Abstract: Meat-eaters report that a number of barriers inhibit them from going vegetarian—for example, perceiving vegetarian diets to be inadequately nutritious, too expensive, unfamiliar, inconvenient, inadequately tasty, and socially stigmatizing. However, research identifying which barriers uniquely predict meat-eaters’ openness to going vegetarian is lacking from the current literature. In the present research, accordingly, we conducted a highly powered, preregistered study (N = 579) to identify which barriers uniquely predict openness to going vegetarian. We focused specifically on anticipated vegetarian stigma, given recent qualitative evidence highlighting this attitude as an influential barrier. That is, do meat-eaters resist going vegetarian because they fear that following a vegetarian diet would make them feel stigmatized? Being of younger age, more politically conservative, White, and residing in a rural community predicted greater anticipated vegetarian stigma among meat-eaters. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses converged, however, to suggest that anticipated vegetarian stigma was not a significant predictor of openness to going vegetarian. The strongest predictors of openness were perceived tastiness and perceived healthfulness of vegetarian dieting. These factors—but not anticipated stigma—furthermore explained why men (compared to women) and political conservatives (compared to liberals) were particularly resistant to going vegetarian.
Bullshitting frequency was positively associated with overclaiming and negatively associated with sincere self-presentation, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, & self-regard
Littrell, Shane, Evan Risko, and Jonathan A. Fugelsang. 2019. “The Bullshitting Frequency Scale: Development and Psychometric Properties.” PsyArXiv. September 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dxzqh
Abstract: Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act), leaving several important theoretical questions thus far unanswered. Here, we present results from three studies focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in bullshitting in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was positively associated with overclaiming and negatively associated with sincere self-presentation, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting.
Introduction
“One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share.” – Harry Frankfurt (1986)
Given the increasing prevalence of misleading information and “fake news” on the internet and society at large (Lewandosky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017), a growing body of work has emerged that focuses on better understanding the nature of bullshit and bullshitting. Some has been more descriptive, highlighting the use of bullshit in politics (Kristansen & Kaussler, 2018), business organizations (Martin & Wilson, 2011; Spicer, 2013), academic settings (Cohen, 2012), and everyday life (Frankfurt, 1986). Other research, in psychology, has taken a more empirical approach, examining individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit and the production of bullshit (i.e., bullshitting). For instance, multiple studies have linked bullshit receptivity (i.e., the propensity to rate vacuous, randomly-generated statements as profound) to factors such as decreased engagement in analytic thinking (Pennycook, Cheyene, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) and biased pattern perception (Walker, Turpin, Stolz, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2019). Other work has examined the functions of bullshit production (i.e., bullshitting) as a strategy for managing impressions and attitude change in areas from simple social interactions to assessments of abstract art (Petrocelli, 2018; Turpin et al., 2019).
Bullshitting, broadly defined
Philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1986) is perhaps best known for his seminal piece, On Bullshit, in which he described a “bullshitter” as a person who deliberately conveys a false/phony impression of himself or his intentions in a way that is unconcerned with the truth. In other words, the veracity of what the bullshitter is saying does not matter, as his or her primary concern is whether others are persuaded by it. Frankfurt contrasts this from lying in that the liar is deliberately attempting to get others to believe a falsehood. A key distinction is in the motivation; a liar’s goal is to deceive whereas a bullshitter’s goal is often to impress.
Though this explication of bullshitting is generally well-regarded, some have critiqued it as capturing “just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit” (Cohen, 2012). Indeed, several have modified or expanded on his definitions to provide a more comprehensive view of bullshitting in daily life. For instance, Cohen (2012) highlighted that the aim of some bullshitters is to impress using discourse constructed with “unclarifiable unclarity”; that is, relying on vacuous, confusing buzzwords which obscure the fact that the statements, while superficially impressive, contain no discernible meaning. An example cited is the arguably impenetrable, jargon-heavy writing found in some academic publications. For Cohen, this type of bullshit is distinct from Frankfurtian bullshit in that the Cohen-bullshitter is unconcerned with the lucidity of what he says, rather than unconcerned with its truth-value (Cohen, 2012).
Another proposed type of bullshit/bullshitting is evasive bullshitting, which involves speech aimed at avoiding answering questions one does not want to answer, as giving direct answers may be harmful to oneself or others (Carson, 2016). For instance, a politician may be motivated to use evasive bullshitting when questioned by a member of the press if, for instance, a direct answer could potentially cost votes (harm to self) or jeopardize national security (harm to others). An equally common example might be one’s romantic partner asking if their new haircut or outfit makes them look unattractive. In some cases, a frank response might result in undesirable social costs for either party (or both).
Finally, some have attempted to refine Frankfurt’s assertion that bullshitting, by definition, is unconnected to a concern for the truth (Frankfurt, 1986, p. 90). For instance, Stokke and Fallis (2017) characterize bullshitting as speech that is unconcerned with the truthful advancement of an honest discourse, rather than unconcerned with the veracity of individual statements. Put another way, the bullshitter is not indifferent toward the truth-value of the content of each thing he says. Rather, he is indifferent toward whether his statements create an impression that the overall discourse leads to an honest representation of the truth. Meibauer (2018) describes bullshitting as having a “misrepresentational intent” that is based on “a loose concern for the truth” (p. 366). That is, the bullshitter may not know the truth-value of his statements, yet he is often aware of his unawareness, and asserts himself with a sense of certainty that his statements are true regardless. Indeed, the bullshitter’s goal is not to communicate an objective truth, but to instill a particular belief or impression in another person – regardless of whether the bullshitter also believes it – and can be accomplished through misleading exaggeration or implicature (Stokke & Fallis, 2017; Webber, 2013).
Abstract: Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act), leaving several important theoretical questions thus far unanswered. Here, we present results from three studies focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in bullshitting in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was positively associated with overclaiming and negatively associated with sincere self-presentation, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting.
Introduction
“One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share.” – Harry Frankfurt (1986)
Given the increasing prevalence of misleading information and “fake news” on the internet and society at large (Lewandosky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017), a growing body of work has emerged that focuses on better understanding the nature of bullshit and bullshitting. Some has been more descriptive, highlighting the use of bullshit in politics (Kristansen & Kaussler, 2018), business organizations (Martin & Wilson, 2011; Spicer, 2013), academic settings (Cohen, 2012), and everyday life (Frankfurt, 1986). Other research, in psychology, has taken a more empirical approach, examining individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit and the production of bullshit (i.e., bullshitting). For instance, multiple studies have linked bullshit receptivity (i.e., the propensity to rate vacuous, randomly-generated statements as profound) to factors such as decreased engagement in analytic thinking (Pennycook, Cheyene, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) and biased pattern perception (Walker, Turpin, Stolz, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2019). Other work has examined the functions of bullshit production (i.e., bullshitting) as a strategy for managing impressions and attitude change in areas from simple social interactions to assessments of abstract art (Petrocelli, 2018; Turpin et al., 2019).
Bullshitting, broadly defined
Philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1986) is perhaps best known for his seminal piece, On Bullshit, in which he described a “bullshitter” as a person who deliberately conveys a false/phony impression of himself or his intentions in a way that is unconcerned with the truth. In other words, the veracity of what the bullshitter is saying does not matter, as his or her primary concern is whether others are persuaded by it. Frankfurt contrasts this from lying in that the liar is deliberately attempting to get others to believe a falsehood. A key distinction is in the motivation; a liar’s goal is to deceive whereas a bullshitter’s goal is often to impress.
Though this explication of bullshitting is generally well-regarded, some have critiqued it as capturing “just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit” (Cohen, 2012). Indeed, several have modified or expanded on his definitions to provide a more comprehensive view of bullshitting in daily life. For instance, Cohen (2012) highlighted that the aim of some bullshitters is to impress using discourse constructed with “unclarifiable unclarity”; that is, relying on vacuous, confusing buzzwords which obscure the fact that the statements, while superficially impressive, contain no discernible meaning. An example cited is the arguably impenetrable, jargon-heavy writing found in some academic publications. For Cohen, this type of bullshit is distinct from Frankfurtian bullshit in that the Cohen-bullshitter is unconcerned with the lucidity of what he says, rather than unconcerned with its truth-value (Cohen, 2012).
Another proposed type of bullshit/bullshitting is evasive bullshitting, which involves speech aimed at avoiding answering questions one does not want to answer, as giving direct answers may be harmful to oneself or others (Carson, 2016). For instance, a politician may be motivated to use evasive bullshitting when questioned by a member of the press if, for instance, a direct answer could potentially cost votes (harm to self) or jeopardize national security (harm to others). An equally common example might be one’s romantic partner asking if their new haircut or outfit makes them look unattractive. In some cases, a frank response might result in undesirable social costs for either party (or both).
Finally, some have attempted to refine Frankfurt’s assertion that bullshitting, by definition, is unconnected to a concern for the truth (Frankfurt, 1986, p. 90). For instance, Stokke and Fallis (2017) characterize bullshitting as speech that is unconcerned with the truthful advancement of an honest discourse, rather than unconcerned with the veracity of individual statements. Put another way, the bullshitter is not indifferent toward the truth-value of the content of each thing he says. Rather, he is indifferent toward whether his statements create an impression that the overall discourse leads to an honest representation of the truth. Meibauer (2018) describes bullshitting as having a “misrepresentational intent” that is based on “a loose concern for the truth” (p. 366). That is, the bullshitter may not know the truth-value of his statements, yet he is often aware of his unawareness, and asserts himself with a sense of certainty that his statements are true regardless. Indeed, the bullshitter’s goal is not to communicate an objective truth, but to instill a particular belief or impression in another person – regardless of whether the bullshitter also believes it – and can be accomplished through misleading exaggeration or implicature (Stokke & Fallis, 2017; Webber, 2013).
Claims for mirror self-recognition have been made for numerous species ranging from dolphins and elephants to fish and ants; reproducible experimental evidence is avaialable only for some great apes
Gallup, G. G., Jr., & Anderson, J. R. (2019). Self-recognition in animals: Where do we stand 50 years later? Lessons from cleaner wrasse and other species. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, Sep 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000206
Abstract: Claims for mirror self-recognition have been made for numerous species ranging from dolphins and elephants to fish and ants. But based on rigorous, reproducible experimental evidence only some great apes and humans have shown clear, consistent and convincing evidence that they are capable of correctly deciphering mirrored information about themselves. In this article we critique some of the recent claims for self-recognition in other species and summarize some of the cognitive implications of the capacity to become the object of your own attention. Recent neurobiological evidence now appears to validate the connection between self-recognition and self-awareness.
Check also A Killer Whale’s (Orcinus orca) Response to Visual Media. Pepper Hanna et al. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 30. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/a-killer-whale-watches-other-cetaceans.html
Abstract: Claims for mirror self-recognition have been made for numerous species ranging from dolphins and elephants to fish and ants. But based on rigorous, reproducible experimental evidence only some great apes and humans have shown clear, consistent and convincing evidence that they are capable of correctly deciphering mirrored information about themselves. In this article we critique some of the recent claims for self-recognition in other species and summarize some of the cognitive implications of the capacity to become the object of your own attention. Recent neurobiological evidence now appears to validate the connection between self-recognition and self-awareness.
Check also A Killer Whale’s (Orcinus orca) Response to Visual Media. Pepper Hanna et al. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 30. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/a-killer-whale-watches-other-cetaceans.html
Friday, September 27, 2019
From 2015... Male homosexual preference: Available data challenges the common view of MHP being a “virtually universal” trait; social stratification together with hypergyny seem necessary for its evolution
From 2015... Barthes J, Crochet P-A, Raymond M (2015) Male Homosexual Preference: Where, When, Why? PLoS ONE 10(8), Aug 12 2016, e0134817. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0134817
Abstract: Male homosexual preference (MHP) has long been of interest to scholars studying the evolution of human sexuality. Indeed, MHP is partially heritable, induces a reproductive cost and is common. MHP has thus been considered a Darwinian paradox. Several questions arise when MHP is considered in an evolutionary context. At what point did MHP appear in the human evolutionary history? Is MHP present in all human groups? How has MHP evolved, given that MHP is a reproductively costly trait? These questions were addressed here, using data from the anthropological and archaeological literature. Our detailed analysis of the available data challenges the common view of MHP being a “virtually universal” trait present in humans since prehistory. The conditions under which it is possible to affirm that MHP was present in past societies are discussed. Furthermore, using anthropological reports, the presence or absence of MHP was documented for 107 societies, allowing us to conclude that evidence of the absence of MHP is available for some societies. A recent evolutionary hypothesis has argued that social stratification together with hypergyny (the hypergyny hypothesis) are necessary conditions for the evolution of MHP. Here, the link between the level of stratification and the probability of observing MHP was tested using an unprecedented large dataset. Furthermore, the test was performed for the first time by controlling for the phylogenetic non-independence between societies. A positive relationship was observed between the level of social stratification and the probability of observing MHP, supporting the hypergyny hypothesis.
From 2016... Homophobia might reflect concerns about sexuality in general and not homosexuality in particular
From 2016... Homophobia Is Related to a Low Interest in Sexuality in General: An Analysis of Pupillometric Evoked Responses. Boris Cheval et al. The Journal of Sexual Medicine, Volume 13, Issue 10, October 2016, Pages 1539-1545. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2016.07.013
Abstract
Introduction: A recent study by Cheval et al (J Sex Med 2016;13:825–834) found that individuals high in homophobia look significantly less long at sex-related photographs, regardless of their nature (ie, homosexual or heterosexual). Because viewing time is under some conscious control, this result could indicate that individuals high in homophobia have a low sexual interest in any sexual stimuli or are consciously motivated to avoid sexual material in line with their conscious values.
Aim: To determine the mechanism underlying shorter viewing time of sex-related photographs in individuals high in homophobia using pupil dilatation, which is considered a spontaneous, unconscious, and uncontrollable index of sexual interest.
Methods: Heterosexual men (N = 36) completed a questionnaire assessing their level of homo-negativity and then performed a picture-viewing task with simultaneous eye-tracking recording to assess their pupillary responses to the presentation of sexually related or neutral photographs.
Main Outcome Measures: Non-linear mixed models were carried out to fit the individual non-linear trajectories of pupillary reaction. Different parameters were obtained including the final asymptote of the pupillary response.
Results: Results showed that the final pupil size of men high in homophobia increased significantly less to the presentation of sex-related images (ie, heterosexual and homosexual) than the pupil size of men low in homophobia. In contrast, no significant difference in the final pupil size reaction toward homosexual images (vs heterosexual images) emerged between men high and men low in homophobia.
Conclusion: Theoretically, these findings reinforce the necessity to consider that homophobia might reflect concerns about sexuality in general and not homosexuality in particular.
Key Words: HomophobiaEye TrackingPupillary ResponsesSexual Interest
Moderate to strong evidence for the absence of an experimental effect: Belief in a controlling God did not increase after a threat compared to an affirmation of personal control (US & the Netherlands)
Hoogeveen, Suzanne, Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Aaron Kay, and Michiel van Elk. 2019. “Compensatory Control and Belief in God: A Registered Replication Report Across Two Countries.” PsyArXiv. September 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/vqu2x
Abstract: Compensatory Control Theory (CCT) suggests that religious belief systems provide an external source of control that can substitute a perceived lack of personal control. In a seminal paper, Kay et al. (2008) experimentally demonstrated that a threat to personal control increases endorsement of the existence of a controlling God. In the current registered report, we conducted a high-powered (N = 829) direct replication of this effect, using samples from the Netherlands and the United States. Our results show moderate to strong evidence for the absence of an experimental effect across both countries: belief in a controlling God did not increase after a threat compared to an affirmation of personal control. In a complementary preregistered analysis, an inverse relation between general feelings of personal control and belief in a controlling God was found in the US, but not in the Netherlands. We discuss potential reasons for the replication failure of the experimental effect and cultural mechanisms explaining the cross-country difference in the correlational effect. Together, our findings suggest that experimental manipulations of control may be ineffective in shifting belief in God, but that individual differences in the experience of control may be related to religious beliefs in a way that is consistent with CCT.
Abstract: Compensatory Control Theory (CCT) suggests that religious belief systems provide an external source of control that can substitute a perceived lack of personal control. In a seminal paper, Kay et al. (2008) experimentally demonstrated that a threat to personal control increases endorsement of the existence of a controlling God. In the current registered report, we conducted a high-powered (N = 829) direct replication of this effect, using samples from the Netherlands and the United States. Our results show moderate to strong evidence for the absence of an experimental effect across both countries: belief in a controlling God did not increase after a threat compared to an affirmation of personal control. In a complementary preregistered analysis, an inverse relation between general feelings of personal control and belief in a controlling God was found in the US, but not in the Netherlands. We discuss potential reasons for the replication failure of the experimental effect and cultural mechanisms explaining the cross-country difference in the correlational effect. Together, our findings suggest that experimental manipulations of control may be ineffective in shifting belief in God, but that individual differences in the experience of control may be related to religious beliefs in a way that is consistent with CCT.
Religiosity Predicts Evidentiary Standards: Religious individuals exhibited a bias for believing religious claims relative to scientific claims, while nonreligious guys were consistent in their standards of evidence across domains
Religiosity Predicts Evidentiary Standards. Emilio J. C. Lobato et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, September 9, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619869613
Abstract: Research shows that religious and nonreligious individuals have different standards of evidence for religious and scientific claims. Here, in a preregistered replication and extension of McPhetres and Zuckerman, participants read about an effect attributed to either a scientific or religious cause, then assessed how much evidence, in the form of successful replications, would be needed to confirm or to reject the causal claim. As previously observed, religious individuals exhibited a bias for believing religious claims relative to scientific claims, while nonreligious individuals were consistent in their standards of evidence across domains. In a novel extension examining standards of evidence with respect to failures of replication, we found that religious individuals were consistent across domains, whereas nonreligious individuals indicated a lower threshold for rejecting religious claims relative to scientific claims. These findings indicate asymmetries in the evaluation of claims based on the presence versus absence of supportive evidence.
Keywords: religion, science, evidence, decision-making
Abstract: Research shows that religious and nonreligious individuals have different standards of evidence for religious and scientific claims. Here, in a preregistered replication and extension of McPhetres and Zuckerman, participants read about an effect attributed to either a scientific or religious cause, then assessed how much evidence, in the form of successful replications, would be needed to confirm or to reject the causal claim. As previously observed, religious individuals exhibited a bias for believing religious claims relative to scientific claims, while nonreligious individuals were consistent in their standards of evidence across domains. In a novel extension examining standards of evidence with respect to failures of replication, we found that religious individuals were consistent across domains, whereas nonreligious individuals indicated a lower threshold for rejecting religious claims relative to scientific claims. These findings indicate asymmetries in the evaluation of claims based on the presence versus absence of supportive evidence.
Keywords: religion, science, evidence, decision-making
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