Sidari, Morgan (2016). A beautiful mind: Testing the sexual selection theory of human intelligence. Honours Thesis, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland. https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:629381
Abstract: The evolutionary forces that gave rise to humans’ extreme intelligence are not well understood. One prominent theory is that our surplus intelligence evolved as a fitness indicator to advertise genetic quality to prospective romantic partners. If our intelligence evolved over multitudes of generations’ romantic and sexual choices, this legacy should be reflected in our preferences today. In this thesis, I test several key predictions from the sexual selection theory of human intelligence. Participants (100 males, 99 females) took part in a speed-dating experiment whereby their verbal and non-verbal intelligence was measured and they provided ratings for each other on intelligence, humour, and attractiveness. I made the following predictions: first, measured intelligence will be detectable through perceptions of intelligence and perceptions of humour (a proposed display of intelligence); second, more intelligent people will be found more attractive by members of the opposite sex. Results showed that more intelligent people were perceived as more intelligent; however, they were not perceived as more humorous. Additionally, those who were perceived to be more intelligent or more humorous were found more attractive; however, those who were actually more intelligent were not. The finding that more intelligent people were not perceived as more humorous is not consistent with humour acting as a display of intelligence. Additionally, ***the findings that perceived intelligence is attractive and measured intelligence is not suggest that it may be the false cues of intelligence that are found attractive***. These results are not consistent with intelligence acting as a fitness indicator; thereby raising important issues with a theory that has been prominent in evolutionary psychology for sixteen years and yet remained relatively untested. Limitations and directions for future research are discussed.
Wednesday, August 9, 2017
Support for redistribution is shaped by compassion, envy, and self-interest, but not a taste for fairness
Support for redistribution is shaped by compassion, envy, and self-interest, but not a taste for fairness. Daniel Sznycer et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 31, 8420–8425. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/31/8420.abstract
Significance: Markets have lifted millions out of poverty, but considerable inequality remains and there is a large worldwide demand for redistribution. Although economists, philosophers, and public policy analysts debate the merits and demerits of various redistributive programs, a parallel debate has focused on voters’ motives for supporting redistribution. Understanding these motives is crucial, for the performance of a policy cannot be meaningfully evaluated except in the light of intended ends. Unfortunately, existing approaches pose ill-specified motives. Chief among them is fairness, a notion that feels intuitive but often rests on multiple inconsistent principles. We show that evolved motives for navigating interpersonal interactions clearly predict attitudes about redistribution, but a taste for procedural fairness or distributional fairness does not.
Abstract: Why do people support economic redistribution? Hypotheses include inequity aversion, a moral sense that inequality is intrinsically unfair, and cultural explanations such as exposure to and assimilation of culturally transmitted ideologies. However, humans have been interacting with worse-off and better-off individuals over evolutionary time, and our motivational systems may have been naturally selected to navigate the opportunities and challenges posed by such recurrent interactions. We hypothesize that modern redistribution is perceived as an ancestral scene involving three notional players: the needy other, the better-off other, and the actor herself. We explore how three motivational systems—compassion, self-interest, and envy—guide responses to the needy other and the better-off other, and how they pattern responses to redistribution. Data from the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel support this model. Endorsement of redistribution is independently predicted by dispositional compassion, dispositional envy, and the expectation of personal gain from redistribution. By contrast, a taste for fairness, in the sense of (i) universality in the application of laws and standards, or (ii) low variance in group-level payoffs, fails to predict attitudes about redistribution.
Significance: Markets have lifted millions out of poverty, but considerable inequality remains and there is a large worldwide demand for redistribution. Although economists, philosophers, and public policy analysts debate the merits and demerits of various redistributive programs, a parallel debate has focused on voters’ motives for supporting redistribution. Understanding these motives is crucial, for the performance of a policy cannot be meaningfully evaluated except in the light of intended ends. Unfortunately, existing approaches pose ill-specified motives. Chief among them is fairness, a notion that feels intuitive but often rests on multiple inconsistent principles. We show that evolved motives for navigating interpersonal interactions clearly predict attitudes about redistribution, but a taste for procedural fairness or distributional fairness does not.
Abstract: Why do people support economic redistribution? Hypotheses include inequity aversion, a moral sense that inequality is intrinsically unfair, and cultural explanations such as exposure to and assimilation of culturally transmitted ideologies. However, humans have been interacting with worse-off and better-off individuals over evolutionary time, and our motivational systems may have been naturally selected to navigate the opportunities and challenges posed by such recurrent interactions. We hypothesize that modern redistribution is perceived as an ancestral scene involving three notional players: the needy other, the better-off other, and the actor herself. We explore how three motivational systems—compassion, self-interest, and envy—guide responses to the needy other and the better-off other, and how they pattern responses to redistribution. Data from the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel support this model. Endorsement of redistribution is independently predicted by dispositional compassion, dispositional envy, and the expectation of personal gain from redistribution. By contrast, a taste for fairness, in the sense of (i) universality in the application of laws and standards, or (ii) low variance in group-level payoffs, fails to predict attitudes about redistribution.
Felt Age, Desired, and Expected Lifetime in the Context of Health, Well-Being, and Successful Aging
Felt Age, Desired, and Expected Lifetime in the Context of Health, Well-Being, and Successful Aging. Neala Ambrosi-Randić, Marina Nekić, Ivana Tucak Junaković. The International Journal of Aging and Human Development, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0091415017720888
Abstract: This study examines the interrelations of three different aspects of the subjective age: felt, desired and expected, as well as their relations with the chronological age (CA), health, and psychological well-being variables. Four hundred and twenty-three community-dwelling Croatian adults, aged 60–95 years, participated in the study. All three subjective age measures significantly correlated with the CA. Self-rated health were better predictors of the subjective age compared to the psychological variables. Among psychological variables, successful aging was the only significant predictor of the felt and expected age, while optimism showed to be the only significant predictor of the desired age. Results indicate the importance of some sociodemographic, psychological, and health variables for understanding older persons' subjective age identity and their desires and expectations regarding length of life. Besides the CA, it is very useful to include subjective age measures in research with elderly people.
Summary: Old adults see themselves as 10 years younger than their chronological age. Desires about lifetime are rather modest (wanted avg 88 and expected avg 84 yo).
Abstract: This study examines the interrelations of three different aspects of the subjective age: felt, desired and expected, as well as their relations with the chronological age (CA), health, and psychological well-being variables. Four hundred and twenty-three community-dwelling Croatian adults, aged 60–95 years, participated in the study. All three subjective age measures significantly correlated with the CA. Self-rated health were better predictors of the subjective age compared to the psychological variables. Among psychological variables, successful aging was the only significant predictor of the felt and expected age, while optimism showed to be the only significant predictor of the desired age. Results indicate the importance of some sociodemographic, psychological, and health variables for understanding older persons' subjective age identity and their desires and expectations regarding length of life. Besides the CA, it is very useful to include subjective age measures in research with elderly people.
Summary: Old adults see themselves as 10 years younger than their chronological age. Desires about lifetime are rather modest (wanted avg 88 and expected avg 84 yo).
Consumption and Income Inequality in the U.S. Since the 1960s
Consumption and Income Inequality in the U.S. Since the 1960s. Bruce D. Meyer, James X. Sullivan. NBER Working Paper No. 23655, http://www.nber.org/papers/w23655
Official income inequality statistics indicate a sharp rise in inequality over the past five decades. These statistics do not accurately reflect inequality because income is poorly measured, particularly in the tails of the distribution, and current income differs from permanent income, failing to capture the consumption paid for through borrowing and dissaving and the consumption of durables such as houses and cars. We examine income inequality between 1963 and 2014 using the Current Population Survey and consumption inequality between 1960 and 2014 using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. We construct improved measures of consumption, focusing on its well-measured components that are reported at a high and stable rate relative to national accounts. While overall income inequality (as measured by the 90/10 ratio) rose over the past five decades, the rise in overall consumption inequality was small. The patterns for the two measures differ by decade, and they moved in opposite directions after 2006. Income inequality rose in both the top and bottom halves of the distribution, but increases in consumption inequality are only evident in the top half. The differences are also concentrated in single parent families and single individuals. Although changing demographics can account for some of the changes in consumption inequality, they account for little of the changes in income inequality. Consumption smoothing cannot explain the differences between income and consumption at the very bottom, but the declining quality of income data can. Asset price changes likely account for some of the differences between the measures in recent years for the top half of the distribution.
Official income inequality statistics indicate a sharp rise in inequality over the past five decades. These statistics do not accurately reflect inequality because income is poorly measured, particularly in the tails of the distribution, and current income differs from permanent income, failing to capture the consumption paid for through borrowing and dissaving and the consumption of durables such as houses and cars. We examine income inequality between 1963 and 2014 using the Current Population Survey and consumption inequality between 1960 and 2014 using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. We construct improved measures of consumption, focusing on its well-measured components that are reported at a high and stable rate relative to national accounts. While overall income inequality (as measured by the 90/10 ratio) rose over the past five decades, the rise in overall consumption inequality was small. The patterns for the two measures differ by decade, and they moved in opposite directions after 2006. Income inequality rose in both the top and bottom halves of the distribution, but increases in consumption inequality are only evident in the top half. The differences are also concentrated in single parent families and single individuals. Although changing demographics can account for some of the changes in consumption inequality, they account for little of the changes in income inequality. Consumption smoothing cannot explain the differences between income and consumption at the very bottom, but the declining quality of income data can. Asset price changes likely account for some of the differences between the measures in recent years for the top half of the distribution.
Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the Origins of Partisan Extremism
Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the Origins of Partisan Extremism. Matthew D. Luttig. Public Opinion Quarterly, August 02, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx023
Abstract: What drives affective polarization in American politics? One common argument is that Democrats and Republicans are deeply polarized today because they are psychologically different—motivated by diametrically opposed and clashing worldviews. This paper argues that the same psychological motivation—authoritarianism—is positively related to partisan extremism among both Republicans and Democrats. Across four studies, this paper shows that authoritarianism is associated with strong partisanship and heightened affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, strong Republicans and Democrats are psychologically similar, at least with respect to authoritarianism. As authoritarianism provides an indicator of underlying needs to belong, these findings support a view of mass polarization as nonsubstantive and group-centric, not driven by competing ideological values or clashing psychological worldviews.
Abstract: What drives affective polarization in American politics? One common argument is that Democrats and Republicans are deeply polarized today because they are psychologically different—motivated by diametrically opposed and clashing worldviews. This paper argues that the same psychological motivation—authoritarianism—is positively related to partisan extremism among both Republicans and Democrats. Across four studies, this paper shows that authoritarianism is associated with strong partisanship and heightened affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, strong Republicans and Democrats are psychologically similar, at least with respect to authoritarianism. As authoritarianism provides an indicator of underlying needs to belong, these findings support a view of mass polarization as nonsubstantive and group-centric, not driven by competing ideological values or clashing psychological worldviews.
Persistent effect of sex ratios on relationship quality and life satisfaction
Persistent effect of sex ratios on relationship quality and life satisfaction. Pauline Grosjean, Robert C. Brooks. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. Volume 372, issue 1729, September 19, 2017. http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/372/1729/20160315
Abstract: Convict transportation to Australia imposed heavily male-biased sex ratios in some areas, altering the convict-era mating market and generating long-running cultural effects that persist to the present day. We test whether convict-era sex ratios have altered marital and overall life satisfaction today, through their persistent effects on gender norms and household bargaining. We find that both women and men are happier, and the happiness gap within married couples is smaller in areas where convict-era sex ratios were heavily male-biased than in areas where sex ratios were historically more even. We discuss our results in light of household bargaining theory, evolutionary sexual conflict theory and the well-documented relationship between conservative attitudes and self-reported happiness.
---
A male-biased sex ratio, which implies a lower supply of women on the marriage market, results in a generally favourable price for women on the mating market, and better bargaining positions for women within the marital household. As a result, under such conditions, mating market models predict that women are more likely to marry, are less likely to participate in the labour force, and consume more leisure [6–10]. Evidence from traditional [11], historic [12] and industrialized [13] societies suggests that behavioural responses to imbalanced adult sex ratios can be both facultative and highly sensitive to ecological, economic and cultural context.
Abstract: Convict transportation to Australia imposed heavily male-biased sex ratios in some areas, altering the convict-era mating market and generating long-running cultural effects that persist to the present day. We test whether convict-era sex ratios have altered marital and overall life satisfaction today, through their persistent effects on gender norms and household bargaining. We find that both women and men are happier, and the happiness gap within married couples is smaller in areas where convict-era sex ratios were heavily male-biased than in areas where sex ratios were historically more even. We discuss our results in light of household bargaining theory, evolutionary sexual conflict theory and the well-documented relationship between conservative attitudes and self-reported happiness.
---
A male-biased sex ratio, which implies a lower supply of women on the marriage market, results in a generally favourable price for women on the mating market, and better bargaining positions for women within the marital household. As a result, under such conditions, mating market models predict that women are more likely to marry, are less likely to participate in the labour force, and consume more leisure [6–10]. Evidence from traditional [11], historic [12] and industrialized [13] societies suggests that behavioural responses to imbalanced adult sex ratios can be both facultative and highly sensitive to ecological, economic and cultural context.
Wild Voices: Mimicry, Reversal, Metaphor, and the Emergence of Language
Wild Voices: Mimicry, Reversal, Metaphor, and the Emergence of Language. Chris Knight and Jerome Lewis. Current Anthropologym v 58, Number 4 | August 2017, www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/692905
Abstract: Why is it that, out of 220 primate species, we are the only one that talks? The relative inflexibility of primate vocal signaling reflects audience pressure for reliability. Where interests conflict, listeners’ resistance to being deceived drives signalers to limit their vocal repertoire to signals that cannot be faked. This constraint was lifted in the human case, we argue, because the original victims of our species’ first deceptive vocalizations were nonhuman animals. When our ancestors were vulnerable hominins equipped with limited weaponry, they kept predators away by increasing the range and diversity of their vocal calls. This led to choral singing, primarily by females, and deceptive mimicry of animal calls, primarily by scavenging and hunting males. A critical feature of our model is the core principle of reversal, whereby deceptive signals aimed originally by a coalition against an external target are subsequently redeployed for honest communicative purposes within the group. We argue that this dynamic culminated ultimately in gestural, vocal, and ritual metaphor, opening the way to word formation and the rapid emergence of grammar.
Abstract: Why is it that, out of 220 primate species, we are the only one that talks? The relative inflexibility of primate vocal signaling reflects audience pressure for reliability. Where interests conflict, listeners’ resistance to being deceived drives signalers to limit their vocal repertoire to signals that cannot be faked. This constraint was lifted in the human case, we argue, because the original victims of our species’ first deceptive vocalizations were nonhuman animals. When our ancestors were vulnerable hominins equipped with limited weaponry, they kept predators away by increasing the range and diversity of their vocal calls. This led to choral singing, primarily by females, and deceptive mimicry of animal calls, primarily by scavenging and hunting males. A critical feature of our model is the core principle of reversal, whereby deceptive signals aimed originally by a coalition against an external target are subsequently redeployed for honest communicative purposes within the group. We argue that this dynamic culminated ultimately in gestural, vocal, and ritual metaphor, opening the way to word formation and the rapid emergence of grammar.
The Good, the Bad, and the Male: Men, But Not Women, Avoid Own-Gender Stereotypical Judgments of Affective Valence
The Good, the Bad, and the Male: Men, But Not Women, Avoid Own-Gender Stereotypical Judgments of Affective Valence. Markus Conrad and Christian von Scheve. Gender Issues, September 2017, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 223–239, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12147-016-9177-2
Abstract: We examine gender differences in the endorsement of gender-stereotypical judgments of the affective valence of social concepts. Sociological as well as social psychological theories indicate that individuals are inclined to behave in ways concordant with prevailing roles and corresponding stereotypes. Recent debates suggest gender biases in the social desirability of gender-stereotype endorsement. We use words with apparent gender differences in perceived affective valence and ask participants to (a) individually rate the valence of each word, (b) estimate how, in general, same-sex individuals would rate the word, and (c) estimate how, in general, opposite-sex individuals would rate the word. Results show that female participants’ self-ratings align with their estimated ratings of the majority of women, whereas male participants’ self-ratings notably deviate from their estimated male majority ratings. We interpret these results as a consequence of a declining esteem of stereotypically male attributes in society.
Abstract: We examine gender differences in the endorsement of gender-stereotypical judgments of the affective valence of social concepts. Sociological as well as social psychological theories indicate that individuals are inclined to behave in ways concordant with prevailing roles and corresponding stereotypes. Recent debates suggest gender biases in the social desirability of gender-stereotype endorsement. We use words with apparent gender differences in perceived affective valence and ask participants to (a) individually rate the valence of each word, (b) estimate how, in general, same-sex individuals would rate the word, and (c) estimate how, in general, opposite-sex individuals would rate the word. Results show that female participants’ self-ratings align with their estimated ratings of the majority of women, whereas male participants’ self-ratings notably deviate from their estimated male majority ratings. We interpret these results as a consequence of a declining esteem of stereotypically male attributes in society.
Survival of the Fittest and the Sexiest: Evolutionary Origins of Adolescent Bullying
Survival of the Fittest and the Sexiest: Evolutionary Origins of Adolescent Bullying. Jun-Bin Koh, and Jennifer S. Wong. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0886260515593546
Abstract: The central idea of evolutionary psychology theory (EPT) is that species evolve to carry or exhibit certain traits/behaviors because these characteristics increase their ability to survive and reproduce. Proponents of EPT propose that bullying emerges from evolutionary development, providing an adaptive edge for gaining better sexual opportunities and physical protection, and promoting mental health. This study examines adolescent bullying behaviors via the lens of EPT. Questionnaires were administered to 135 adolescents, ages 13 to 16, from one secondary school in metro Vancouver, British Columbia. Participants were categorized into one of four groups (bullies, victims, bully/victims, or bystanders) according to their involvement in bullying interactions as measured by the Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire. Four dependent variables were examined: depression, self-esteem, social status, and social anxiety. Results indicate that bullies had the most positive scores on mental health measures and held the highest social rank in the school environment, with significant differences limited to comparisons between bullies and bully/victims. These results lend support to the hypothesis that youth bullying is derived from evolutionary development. Implications for approaching anti-bullying strategies in schools and directions for future studies are discussed.
Abstract: The central idea of evolutionary psychology theory (EPT) is that species evolve to carry or exhibit certain traits/behaviors because these characteristics increase their ability to survive and reproduce. Proponents of EPT propose that bullying emerges from evolutionary development, providing an adaptive edge for gaining better sexual opportunities and physical protection, and promoting mental health. This study examines adolescent bullying behaviors via the lens of EPT. Questionnaires were administered to 135 adolescents, ages 13 to 16, from one secondary school in metro Vancouver, British Columbia. Participants were categorized into one of four groups (bullies, victims, bully/victims, or bystanders) according to their involvement in bullying interactions as measured by the Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire. Four dependent variables were examined: depression, self-esteem, social status, and social anxiety. Results indicate that bullies had the most positive scores on mental health measures and held the highest social rank in the school environment, with significant differences limited to comparisons between bullies and bully/victims. These results lend support to the hypothesis that youth bullying is derived from evolutionary development. Implications for approaching anti-bullying strategies in schools and directions for future studies are discussed.
Tuesday, August 8, 2017
Prof lets students choose own grades for 'stress reduction,' allows computers and books in exams
Prof lets students choose own grades for 'stress reduction,' allows computers and books in exams, etc.
By Anthony Gockowski.
Campus Reform, Aug 07, 2017
http://www.campusreform.org/?ID=9551
Do you see me the way I see myself? Narcissists are less prone to illusion of transparency than other people
Do you see me the way I see myself? Narcissists are less prone to illusion of transparency than other people. Laetitia Renier, Claudia Toma, and Olivier Corneille.
Abstract: People tend to believe that their internal states are transparent to others (e.g. illusion of transparency), and even more when they are self-centred. Would it be the case for narcissistic individuals who are highly self-centred? Three studies investigated whether narcissists feel more transparent because they are egocentric, or whether they feel less transparent because they are socially skilled. Using a vignette method, Study 1 showed that the more participants were narcissists, the less they felt transparent with regard to their emotions, values and behaviour. Study 2 further showed that this association was stronger when narcissistic characteristics were valorised. In addition, the negative link between narcissism and felt transparency was mediated by self-monitoring. Using a face-to-face interaction, Study 3 provided evidence that participants high on narcissism were less prone to illusion of transparency. Overall our studies suggest that narcissists’ meta-perception is more accurate, less egocentric because they are socially skilled.
Abstract: People tend to believe that their internal states are transparent to others (e.g. illusion of transparency), and even more when they are self-centred. Would it be the case for narcissistic individuals who are highly self-centred? Three studies investigated whether narcissists feel more transparent because they are egocentric, or whether they feel less transparent because they are socially skilled. Using a vignette method, Study 1 showed that the more participants were narcissists, the less they felt transparent with regard to their emotions, values and behaviour. Study 2 further showed that this association was stronger when narcissistic characteristics were valorised. In addition, the negative link between narcissism and felt transparency was mediated by self-monitoring. Using a face-to-face interaction, Study 3 provided evidence that participants high on narcissism were less prone to illusion of transparency. Overall our studies suggest that narcissists’ meta-perception is more accurate, less egocentric because they are socially skilled.
Death Before Dishonor: Incurring Costs to Protect Moral Reputation
Death Before Dishonor: Incurring Costs to Protect Moral Reputation. Andrew J. Vonasch et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550617720271
Abstract: Predicated on the notion that people’s survival depends greatly on participation in cooperative society, and that reputation damage may preclude such participation, four studies with diverse methods tested the hypothesis that people would make substantial sacrifices to protect their reputations. A “big data” study found that maintaining a moral reputation is one of people’s most important values. In making hypothetical choices, ***high percentages of “normal” people reported preferring jail time, amputation of limbs, and death to various forms of reputation damage (i.e., becoming known as a criminal, Nazi, or child molester)***. Two lab studies found that 30% of people fully submerged their hands in a pile of disgusting live worms, and 63% endured physical pain to prevent dissemination of information suggesting that they were racist. We discuss the implications of reputation protection for theories about altruism and motivation.
Abstract: Predicated on the notion that people’s survival depends greatly on participation in cooperative society, and that reputation damage may preclude such participation, four studies with diverse methods tested the hypothesis that people would make substantial sacrifices to protect their reputations. A “big data” study found that maintaining a moral reputation is one of people’s most important values. In making hypothetical choices, ***high percentages of “normal” people reported preferring jail time, amputation of limbs, and death to various forms of reputation damage (i.e., becoming known as a criminal, Nazi, or child molester)***. Two lab studies found that 30% of people fully submerged their hands in a pile of disgusting live worms, and 63% endured physical pain to prevent dissemination of information suggesting that they were racist. We discuss the implications of reputation protection for theories about altruism and motivation.
Harm to self outweighs benefit to others in moral decision making
Harm to self outweighs benefit to others in moral decision making. Lukas J Volz et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 30, 7963–7968. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/30/7963.abstract
Significance: Principles guiding decisions that affect both ourselves and others are of prominent importance for human societies. Previous accounts in economics and psychological science have often described decision making as either categorically egoistic or altruistic. Instead, the present work shows that genuine altruism is embedded in context-specific egoistic bias. Participants were willing to both forgo monetary reward to spare the other from painful electric shocks and also to suffer painful electric shocks to secure monetary reward for the other. However, across all trials and conditions, participants accrued more reward and less harm for the self than for the other person. These results characterize human decision makers as egoistically biased altruists, with important implications for psychology, economics, and public policy.
Abstract: How we make decisions that have direct consequences for ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society. Whereas economic theory contends that humans aim at maximizing their own gains, recent seminal psychological work suggests that our behavior is instead hyperaltruistic: We are more willing to sacrifice gains to spare others from harm than to spare ourselves from harm. To investigate how such egoistic and hyperaltruistic tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated trade-off decisions combining monetary rewards and painful electric shocks, administered to the participants themselves or an anonymous other. Whereas we replicated the notion of hyperaltruism (i.e., the willingness to forego reward to spare others from harm), we observed strongly egoistic tendencies in participants’ unwillingness to harm themselves for others’ benefit. The moral principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision making observed in our study is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understanding of economic and social interactions in our society.
Significance: Principles guiding decisions that affect both ourselves and others are of prominent importance for human societies. Previous accounts in economics and psychological science have often described decision making as either categorically egoistic or altruistic. Instead, the present work shows that genuine altruism is embedded in context-specific egoistic bias. Participants were willing to both forgo monetary reward to spare the other from painful electric shocks and also to suffer painful electric shocks to secure monetary reward for the other. However, across all trials and conditions, participants accrued more reward and less harm for the self than for the other person. These results characterize human decision makers as egoistically biased altruists, with important implications for psychology, economics, and public policy.
Abstract: How we make decisions that have direct consequences for ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society. Whereas economic theory contends that humans aim at maximizing their own gains, recent seminal psychological work suggests that our behavior is instead hyperaltruistic: We are more willing to sacrifice gains to spare others from harm than to spare ourselves from harm. To investigate how such egoistic and hyperaltruistic tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated trade-off decisions combining monetary rewards and painful electric shocks, administered to the participants themselves or an anonymous other. Whereas we replicated the notion of hyperaltruism (i.e., the willingness to forego reward to spare others from harm), we observed strongly egoistic tendencies in participants’ unwillingness to harm themselves for others’ benefit. The moral principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision making observed in our study is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understanding of economic and social interactions in our society.
The Effects of Alcohol Use on Economic Decision Making
The Effects of Alcohol Use on Economic Decision Making. Klajdi Bregu et al. Southern Economic Association Journal, Volume 83, Issue 4, April 2017. Pages 886–902, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/soej.12179/full
Abstract: In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects.
Summary: Under alcohol influence, the subjects acted more cooperatively and showed more altruistic giving in economic games.
Abstract: In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects.
Summary: Under alcohol influence, the subjects acted more cooperatively and showed more altruistic giving in economic games.
Individual risk preferences and the demand for redistribution
Individual risk preferences and the demand for redistribution. Manja Gärtner, Johanna Mollerstrom and David Seim. Journal of Public Economics, v 153, September 2017, Pages 49-55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.009
Highlights
• There is a positive relation between risk aversion and demand for redistribution.
• This relation is robust to controlling for past and current income and wealth.
• Risk aversion partly explains why e.g. women and older people favor redistribution.
Abstract: Redistributive policies can provide an insurance against future negative economic shocks. This, in turn, implies that an individual's demand for redistribution is expected to increase with her risk aversion. To test this prediction, we elicit risk aversion and demand for redistribution through a well-established set of measures in a representative sample of the Swedish population. We document a statistically significant and robust positive relation between risk aversion and the demand for redistribution that is also economically important. We show that previously used proxies for risk aversion (such as being an entrepreneur or having a history of unemployment) do not capture the effect of our measure of risk aversion but have distinctly different effects on the demand for redistribution. We also show evidence indicating that risk aversion can explain significant parts of the well-studied relations between age and gender on the one hand and demand for redistribution on the other.
JEL classification: C83 C91 C93 D63 D81 H23
Keywords: Risk aversion, Redistribution, Inequality, Survey, Experiment
Highlights
• There is a positive relation between risk aversion and demand for redistribution.
• This relation is robust to controlling for past and current income and wealth.
• Risk aversion partly explains why e.g. women and older people favor redistribution.
Abstract: Redistributive policies can provide an insurance against future negative economic shocks. This, in turn, implies that an individual's demand for redistribution is expected to increase with her risk aversion. To test this prediction, we elicit risk aversion and demand for redistribution through a well-established set of measures in a representative sample of the Swedish population. We document a statistically significant and robust positive relation between risk aversion and the demand for redistribution that is also economically important. We show that previously used proxies for risk aversion (such as being an entrepreneur or having a history of unemployment) do not capture the effect of our measure of risk aversion but have distinctly different effects on the demand for redistribution. We also show evidence indicating that risk aversion can explain significant parts of the well-studied relations between age and gender on the one hand and demand for redistribution on the other.
JEL classification: C83 C91 C93 D63 D81 H23
Keywords: Risk aversion, Redistribution, Inequality, Survey, Experiment
Fake News, Fake Problem? An Analysis of the Fake News Audience in the Lead Up to the 2016 Presidential Election
Fake News, Fake Problem? An Analysis of the Fake News Audience in the Lead Up to the 2016 Presidential Election. Jacob L. Nelson. Conference Paper, September 2017. Conference: TPRC, At Arlington, VA. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318470831_Fake_News_Fake_Problem_An_Analysis_of_the_Fake_News_Audience_in_the_Lead_Up_to_the_2016_Presidential_Election
Abstract: In light of the recent U.S. election, many fear that “fake news” has become a powerful and sinister force in the news media environment. These fears stem from the idea that as news consumption increasingly takes place via social media sites, news audiences are more likely to find themselves drawn in by sensational headlines to sources that lack accuracy or legitimacy, with troubling consequences for democracy. However, we know little about the extent to which online audiences are exposed to fake news, and how these outlets factor into the average digital news diet. In this paper, I argue that fears about fake news consumption echo fears about partisan selective exposure, in that both stem from concerns that more media choice leads audiences to consume news that align with their beliefs, and to ignore news that does not. Yet recent studies have concluded that the partisan media audience (1) is small and (2) also consumes news from popular, centrist outlets. I use online news audience data to show a similar phenomenon plays out when it comes to fake news. Findings reveal that social media does indeed play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news sites; however, the actual fake news audience is small, and a large portion of it also visits more popular, “real” news sites. I conclude by discussing the implications of a news media landscape where the audience is exposed to contradictory sources of public affairs information.
Abstract: In light of the recent U.S. election, many fear that “fake news” has become a powerful and sinister force in the news media environment. These fears stem from the idea that as news consumption increasingly takes place via social media sites, news audiences are more likely to find themselves drawn in by sensational headlines to sources that lack accuracy or legitimacy, with troubling consequences for democracy. However, we know little about the extent to which online audiences are exposed to fake news, and how these outlets factor into the average digital news diet. In this paper, I argue that fears about fake news consumption echo fears about partisan selective exposure, in that both stem from concerns that more media choice leads audiences to consume news that align with their beliefs, and to ignore news that does not. Yet recent studies have concluded that the partisan media audience (1) is small and (2) also consumes news from popular, centrist outlets. I use online news audience data to show a similar phenomenon plays out when it comes to fake news. Findings reveal that social media does indeed play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news sites; however, the actual fake news audience is small, and a large portion of it also visits more popular, “real” news sites. I conclude by discussing the implications of a news media landscape where the audience is exposed to contradictory sources of public affairs information.
Dehumanization increases instrumental violence, but not moral violence
Dehumanization increases instrumental violence, but not moral violence. Tage S. Rai, Piercarlo Valdesolo, and Jesse Graham. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 32, 8511–8516, http://www.pnas.org/content/114/32/8511.abstract
Significance: To eliminate violence, we must understand the motives that drive it. Most theories assume that violence is motivated by instrumental gain or impulsiveness, and is restrained by moral inhibitions. In these frameworks, dehumanization breaks down moral inhibitions by reducing perceptions of victims as fellow human beings worthy of concern. However, we argue that much violence is actually motivated by moral sentiments, and that morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm fellow human beings. Across five experiments, we show that dehumanizing victims increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. This distinction, between instrumental violence enabled by dehumanization, and moral violence directed toward human victims, has important implications for understanding how morality and dehumanization interact with violence, and for informing violence reduction efforts worldwide.
Abstract: Across five experiments, we show that dehumanization—the act of perceiving victims as not completely human—increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. In attitude surveys, ascribing reduced capacities for cognitive, experiential, and emotional states to victims predicted support for practices where victims are harmed to achieve instrumental goals, including sweatshop labor, animal experimentation, and drone strikes that result in civilian casualties, but not practices where harm is perceived as morally righteous, including capital punishment, killing in war, and drone strikes that kill terrorists. In vignette experiments, using dehumanizing compared with humanizing language increased participants’ willingness to harm strangers for money, but not participants’ willingness to harm strangers for their immoral behavior. Participants also spontaneously dehumanized strangers when they imagined harming them for money, but not when they imagined harming them for their immoral behavior. Finally, participants humanized strangers who were low in humanity if they imagined harming them for immoral behavior, but not money, suggesting that morally motivated perpetrators may humanize victims to justify violence against them. Our findings indicate that dehumanization enables violence that perpetrators see as unethical, but instrumentally beneficial. In contrast, dehumanization does not contribute to moral violence because morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm complete human beings who are capable of deserving blame, experiencing suffering, and understanding its meaning.
Significance: To eliminate violence, we must understand the motives that drive it. Most theories assume that violence is motivated by instrumental gain or impulsiveness, and is restrained by moral inhibitions. In these frameworks, dehumanization breaks down moral inhibitions by reducing perceptions of victims as fellow human beings worthy of concern. However, we argue that much violence is actually motivated by moral sentiments, and that morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm fellow human beings. Across five experiments, we show that dehumanizing victims increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. This distinction, between instrumental violence enabled by dehumanization, and moral violence directed toward human victims, has important implications for understanding how morality and dehumanization interact with violence, and for informing violence reduction efforts worldwide.
Abstract: Across five experiments, we show that dehumanization—the act of perceiving victims as not completely human—increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. In attitude surveys, ascribing reduced capacities for cognitive, experiential, and emotional states to victims predicted support for practices where victims are harmed to achieve instrumental goals, including sweatshop labor, animal experimentation, and drone strikes that result in civilian casualties, but not practices where harm is perceived as morally righteous, including capital punishment, killing in war, and drone strikes that kill terrorists. In vignette experiments, using dehumanizing compared with humanizing language increased participants’ willingness to harm strangers for money, but not participants’ willingness to harm strangers for their immoral behavior. Participants also spontaneously dehumanized strangers when they imagined harming them for money, but not when they imagined harming them for their immoral behavior. Finally, participants humanized strangers who were low in humanity if they imagined harming them for immoral behavior, but not money, suggesting that morally motivated perpetrators may humanize victims to justify violence against them. Our findings indicate that dehumanization enables violence that perpetrators see as unethical, but instrumentally beneficial. In contrast, dehumanization does not contribute to moral violence because morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm complete human beings who are capable of deserving blame, experiencing suffering, and understanding its meaning.
Pornography consumption and its association with sexual concerns and expectations among young men and women
Pornography consumption and its association with sexual concerns and expectations among young men and women. Kaitlyn Goldsmith et al. The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, https://doi.org/10.3138/cjhs.262-a2
Abstract: The often narrow representations of sexual performance and physical attractiveness in pornography may be linked to sexual concerns and sexual expectations among young men and women (e.g., body- and performance-related sexual distractions, negative genital self-image, expectations of one's partner). Investigation of the relations between these constructs is needed to assess the potential impact of pornography on young adult's sexual lives. Undergraduate men (n=333) and women (n=668) completed an online survey assessing pornography viewership, body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, and pornography-based partner expectations. Multivariate regression analyses revealed that visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with higher partner performance expectations among women. Among men, visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity. Literary pornography use was not uniquely associated with these variables among men or women. The results of this investigation suggest that individuals who consume visual pornography may experience some forms of sexual insecurity and sexual expectations related to their pornography use. Importantly, many sexual concerns were unrelated to pornography consumption, which is consistent with research in favour of pornography consumption as a healthy sexual outlet for young adults.
KEY WORDS: Body image, cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, partner expectations, pornography, sexual body esteem, sexual insecurities, sexually explicit material
Abstract: The often narrow representations of sexual performance and physical attractiveness in pornography may be linked to sexual concerns and sexual expectations among young men and women (e.g., body- and performance-related sexual distractions, negative genital self-image, expectations of one's partner). Investigation of the relations between these constructs is needed to assess the potential impact of pornography on young adult's sexual lives. Undergraduate men (n=333) and women (n=668) completed an online survey assessing pornography viewership, body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, and pornography-based partner expectations. Multivariate regression analyses revealed that visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with higher partner performance expectations among women. Among men, visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity. Literary pornography use was not uniquely associated with these variables among men or women. The results of this investigation suggest that individuals who consume visual pornography may experience some forms of sexual insecurity and sexual expectations related to their pornography use. Importantly, many sexual concerns were unrelated to pornography consumption, which is consistent with research in favour of pornography consumption as a healthy sexual outlet for young adults.
KEY WORDS: Body image, cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, partner expectations, pornography, sexual body esteem, sexual insecurities, sexually explicit material
Health, Anticipated Partner Infidelity, and Jealousy in Men and Women
Health, Anticipated Partner Infidelity, and Jealousy in Men and Women. Steven Arnocky, Marlena Pearson, Tracy Vaillancourt. Evolutionary Psychology, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1474704915593666
Abstract: Health has been identified as an important variable involved in mate choice. Unhealthy organisms are generally less able to provide reproductively important resources to partners and offspring and are more likely to pass on communicable disease. Research on human mate preferences has shown that both men and women prefer healthy mates. Yet to date, little research has examined how health relates to one’s own mating experiences. In the present study, 164 participants (87 women) who were currently in heterosexual romantic relationships completed measures of frequency and severity of health problems, anticipated partner infidelity, and intensity of jealousy felt in their current relationship. Mediation analyses showed that health problems predicted greater anticipated partner infidelity and jealousy scores and that anticipated partner infidelity mediated the links between health and jealousy for both frequency and severity of health problems, controlling for both sex and relationship duration. These findings suggest that unhealthy people perceive themselves to be at a mating disadvantage, experiencing associated differences in perceptions and emotions surrounding their romantic partners’ fidelity.
Abstract: Health has been identified as an important variable involved in mate choice. Unhealthy organisms are generally less able to provide reproductively important resources to partners and offspring and are more likely to pass on communicable disease. Research on human mate preferences has shown that both men and women prefer healthy mates. Yet to date, little research has examined how health relates to one’s own mating experiences. In the present study, 164 participants (87 women) who were currently in heterosexual romantic relationships completed measures of frequency and severity of health problems, anticipated partner infidelity, and intensity of jealousy felt in their current relationship. Mediation analyses showed that health problems predicted greater anticipated partner infidelity and jealousy scores and that anticipated partner infidelity mediated the links between health and jealousy for both frequency and severity of health problems, controlling for both sex and relationship duration. These findings suggest that unhealthy people perceive themselves to be at a mating disadvantage, experiencing associated differences in perceptions and emotions surrounding their romantic partners’ fidelity.
Competing for Love: Applying Sexual Economics Theory to Mating Contests
Competing for Love: Applying Sexual Economics Theory to Mating Contests. Roy F. Baumeister et al. Journal of Economic Psychology, July 29 2017, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016748701630277X
Highlights
• Sexual economics theory analyzes onset of heterosexual relationships in marketplace and economic terms, with women as sellers and men as buyers who exchange nonsexual, often material resources for sex.
• Women compete on sex appeal, offering sex to get material resources from men. Other women are rivals.
• Female competition includes display of charms, physical improvement (e.g., dieting to attain thin ideal), offering sex at slightly lower price than rivals, plus informational warfare (e.g., gossip) to destroy rivals’ reputation while upholding her own.
• The female community often uses pressure and punishment to prevent women from offering sex too freely, following the cartel tactic of restricting the supply to increase the price.
• Men compete to amass resources in order to get sex. Much competition is in groups, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but primarily as potential coalition partners.
Abstract: Sexual economics theory analyzes the onset of heterosexual sex as a marketplace deal in which the woman is the seller and the man is the buyer, with the price paid in nonsexual resources. We extend that theory to analyze same-gender contests in that marketplace, and to elaborate the idea that what the woman sells is not just sex but exclusive access to her sexual charms. Women compete on sex appeal and on the promise of exclusiveness (faithfulness), with the goal of getting a man who will provide material resources. Men compete to amass material resources, with the goal of getting a good sex partner. Female competition includes showing off her sexual charms, offering sex at a lower price than rivals, seeking to improve her physical assets (e.g., by dieting), and use of informational warfare to sully rivals’ reputations while defending her own reputation against malicious gossip. We review evidence of these patterns, including evidence that female body dissatisfaction and pathological eating patterns increase when women perceive an unfavorable sex ratio (i.e., shortage of eligible men). Men compete in groups to amass resources, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but also as coalition partners. Male homophobia is often not about sex but rather invokes the stereotype that a homosexual man will not be an effective coalition partner. Misunderstandings about whether sex or exclusivity is the central commitment can complicate marital adjustment for couples.
Keywords: sex; sexuality; mating; gender; competition; sexual economics; contest
Highlights
• Sexual economics theory analyzes onset of heterosexual relationships in marketplace and economic terms, with women as sellers and men as buyers who exchange nonsexual, often material resources for sex.
• Women compete on sex appeal, offering sex to get material resources from men. Other women are rivals.
• Female competition includes display of charms, physical improvement (e.g., dieting to attain thin ideal), offering sex at slightly lower price than rivals, plus informational warfare (e.g., gossip) to destroy rivals’ reputation while upholding her own.
• The female community often uses pressure and punishment to prevent women from offering sex too freely, following the cartel tactic of restricting the supply to increase the price.
• Men compete to amass resources in order to get sex. Much competition is in groups, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but primarily as potential coalition partners.
Abstract: Sexual economics theory analyzes the onset of heterosexual sex as a marketplace deal in which the woman is the seller and the man is the buyer, with the price paid in nonsexual resources. We extend that theory to analyze same-gender contests in that marketplace, and to elaborate the idea that what the woman sells is not just sex but exclusive access to her sexual charms. Women compete on sex appeal and on the promise of exclusiveness (faithfulness), with the goal of getting a man who will provide material resources. Men compete to amass material resources, with the goal of getting a good sex partner. Female competition includes showing off her sexual charms, offering sex at a lower price than rivals, seeking to improve her physical assets (e.g., by dieting), and use of informational warfare to sully rivals’ reputations while defending her own reputation against malicious gossip. We review evidence of these patterns, including evidence that female body dissatisfaction and pathological eating patterns increase when women perceive an unfavorable sex ratio (i.e., shortage of eligible men). Men compete in groups to amass resources, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but also as coalition partners. Male homophobia is often not about sex but rather invokes the stereotype that a homosexual man will not be an effective coalition partner. Misunderstandings about whether sex or exclusivity is the central commitment can complicate marital adjustment for couples.
Keywords: sex; sexuality; mating; gender; competition; sexual economics; contest
Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating
Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating. Li Zhao et al. Developmental Science, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/desc.12585/abstract
Abstract: The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3- and 5-year-old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.
Abstract: The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3- and 5-year-old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.
The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children
The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children. Libertad González and Tarja Viitanen. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12200/abstract
Abstract: We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being of children, by exploiting the different timing of divorce legalization across Europe. We compare the adult outcomes of cohorts raised when divorce was banned with those of cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same country. We also have ‘control’ countries where all cohorts were exposed (or not exposed) to legal divorce as children. We find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income and worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. These negative effects are not found for men.
Abstract: We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being of children, by exploiting the different timing of divorce legalization across Europe. We compare the adult outcomes of cohorts raised when divorce was banned with those of cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same country. We also have ‘control’ countries where all cohorts were exposed (or not exposed) to legal divorce as children. We find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income and worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. These negative effects are not found for men.
Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field
Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field.Michael Kirchler, Stefan Palan. Experimental Economics, Aug 02 2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-017-9536-1
Abstract: Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food’s preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.
Abstract: Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food’s preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.
Political Differences in Free Will Belief are Driven by Differences in Moralization
Political Differences in Free Will Belief are Driven by Differences in Moralization. Cory J. Clark et al. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011597
Abstract: Five studies tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by their broader view of morality, and thus a broader motivation to assign responsibility. On an individual difference level, Study 1 found that political conservatives’ higher moral wrongness judgments accounted for their higher belief in free will. In Study 2, conservatives ascribed more free will for negative events than liberals, while no differences emerged for positive events. For actions ideologically equivalent in perceived moral wrongness, free will judgments also did not differ (Study 3), and actions that liberals perceived as more wrong, liberals judged as more free (Study 4). Finally, higher wrongness judgments mediated the effect of conservatism on free will beliefs (Study 5). Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
Keywords: free will, morality, blame, motivated cognition, political psychology
Abstract: Five studies tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by their broader view of morality, and thus a broader motivation to assign responsibility. On an individual difference level, Study 1 found that political conservatives’ higher moral wrongness judgments accounted for their higher belief in free will. In Study 2, conservatives ascribed more free will for negative events than liberals, while no differences emerged for positive events. For actions ideologically equivalent in perceived moral wrongness, free will judgments also did not differ (Study 3), and actions that liberals perceived as more wrong, liberals judged as more free (Study 4). Finally, higher wrongness judgments mediated the effect of conservatism on free will beliefs (Study 5). Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
Keywords: free will, morality, blame, motivated cognition, political psychology
Not having schadenfreude can be a signal of Huntington's
Corticostriatal signatures of schadenfreude: evidence from Huntington's disease. Sandra Baez et al. Journal of NeuroIogy, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, on-line Aug 01 2017. http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/early/2017/07/31/jnnp-2017-316055
Abstract: Schadenfreude—pleasure at others’ misfortunes—is a multidetermined social emotion which involves reward processing, mentalising and perspective-taking abilities. Patients with Huntington's disease (HD) exhibit reductions of this experience, suggesting a role of striatal degeneration in such impairment. However, no study has directly assessed the relationship between regional brain atrophy in HD and reduced schadenfreude. Here, we assessed whether grey matter (GM) atrophy in patients with HD correlates with ratings of schadenfreude. First, we compared the performance of 20 patients with HD and 23 controls on an experimental task designed to trigger schadenfreude and envy (another social emotion acting as a control condition). Second, we compared GM volume between groups. Third, we examined brain regions where atrophy might be associated with specific impairments in the patients. While both groups showed similar ratings of envy, patients with HD reported lower schadenfreude. The latter pattern was related to atrophy in regions of the reward system (ventral striatum) and the mentalising network (precuneus and superior parietal lobule). Our results shed light on the intertwining of reward and socioemotional processes in schadenfreude, while offering novel evidence about their neural correlates.
Abstract: Schadenfreude—pleasure at others’ misfortunes—is a multidetermined social emotion which involves reward processing, mentalising and perspective-taking abilities. Patients with Huntington's disease (HD) exhibit reductions of this experience, suggesting a role of striatal degeneration in such impairment. However, no study has directly assessed the relationship between regional brain atrophy in HD and reduced schadenfreude. Here, we assessed whether grey matter (GM) atrophy in patients with HD correlates with ratings of schadenfreude. First, we compared the performance of 20 patients with HD and 23 controls on an experimental task designed to trigger schadenfreude and envy (another social emotion acting as a control condition). Second, we compared GM volume between groups. Third, we examined brain regions where atrophy might be associated with specific impairments in the patients. While both groups showed similar ratings of envy, patients with HD reported lower schadenfreude. The latter pattern was related to atrophy in regions of the reward system (ventral striatum) and the mentalising network (precuneus and superior parietal lobule). Our results shed light on the intertwining of reward and socioemotional processes in schadenfreude, while offering novel evidence about their neural correlates.
Once a Cheater, Always a Cheater? Serial Infidelity Across Subsequent Relationships
Once a Cheater, Always a Cheater? Serial Infidelity Across Subsequent Relationships. Kayla Knopp, Shelby Scott, Lane Ritchie, Galena K. Rhoades, Howard J. Markman, Scott M. Stanley. Archives of Sexual Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-017-1018-1
Abstract: Although there is a large body of research addressing predictors of relationship infidelity, no study to our knowledge has specifically addressed infidelity in a previous relationship as a risk factor for infidelity in a subsequent relationship. The current study addressed risk for serial infidelity by following adult participants (N = 484) longitudinally through two mixed-gender romantic relationships. Participants reported their own extra-dyadic sexual involvement (ESI) (i.e., having sexual relations with someone other than their partner) as well as both known and suspected ESI on the part of their partners in each romantic relationship. Findings from logistic regressions showed that those who reported engaging in ESI in the first relationship were three times more likely to report engaging in ESI in their next relationship compared to those who did not report engaging in ESI in the first relationship. Similarly, compared to those who reported that their first-relationship partners did not engage in ESI, those who knew that their partners in the first relationships had engaged in ESI were twice as likely to report the same behavior from their next relationship partners. Those who suspected their first-relationship partners of ESI were four times more likely to report suspicion of partner ESI again in their next relationships. These findings controlled for demographic risk factors for infidelity and held regardless of respondent gender or marital status. Thus, prior infidelity emerged as an important risk factor for infidelity in next relationships. Implications for novel intervention targets for prevention of serial relationship infidelity are discussed.
Keywords: Dating relationships, Extra-dyadic sexual involvement, Infidelity
Abstract: Although there is a large body of research addressing predictors of relationship infidelity, no study to our knowledge has specifically addressed infidelity in a previous relationship as a risk factor for infidelity in a subsequent relationship. The current study addressed risk for serial infidelity by following adult participants (N = 484) longitudinally through two mixed-gender romantic relationships. Participants reported their own extra-dyadic sexual involvement (ESI) (i.e., having sexual relations with someone other than their partner) as well as both known and suspected ESI on the part of their partners in each romantic relationship. Findings from logistic regressions showed that those who reported engaging in ESI in the first relationship were three times more likely to report engaging in ESI in their next relationship compared to those who did not report engaging in ESI in the first relationship. Similarly, compared to those who reported that their first-relationship partners did not engage in ESI, those who knew that their partners in the first relationships had engaged in ESI were twice as likely to report the same behavior from their next relationship partners. Those who suspected their first-relationship partners of ESI were four times more likely to report suspicion of partner ESI again in their next relationships. These findings controlled for demographic risk factors for infidelity and held regardless of respondent gender or marital status. Thus, prior infidelity emerged as an important risk factor for infidelity in next relationships. Implications for novel intervention targets for prevention of serial relationship infidelity are discussed.
Keywords: Dating relationships, Extra-dyadic sexual involvement, Infidelity
The limitations of Nyhan and Reifler's backfire effect
The limitations of the backfire effect. Kathryn Haglin. Research & Politics, July 3, 2017. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017716547
Abstract: Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) document a “backfire effect,” wherein attempts to correct factual misperceptions increase the prevalence of false beliefs. These results are widely cited both in and outside of political science. In this research note, I report the results of a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccine study that was embedded in a larger study about flu vaccines. The backfire effect was not replicated in my experiment. The main replication result suggests the need for additional studies to verify the backfire effect and identify conditions under which it occurs.
Introduction
Political scientists are increasingly aware of the effect of misperceptions on behavioral intentions and attitudes. While Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) famously note that most citizens do not have much factual knowledge about politics, Kuklinski et al. (2000) point out the differences between being uninformed and misinformed. When a person is misinformed, false, misleading, or unsubstantiated information can create the basis for their policy preferences. Further, the sources used to obtain the misinformation are often directly related to a person’s political preferences.
While there is some evidence that providing relevant facts has the ability to change people’s issue opinions (Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000), information is often received in a much noisier environment. Other studies have found that individuals are often resistant to evidence that contradicts their opinions (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). The literature, however, remains unsettled as to exactly when and how misperceptions can be corrected. In addition, the role of the “backfire effect,” where corrective information can actually make false beliefs more prevalent, in these processes remains unclear. For example, Weeks and Garrett (2014) do not find evidence for the backfire effect in a study about correcting rumors in the 2008 presidential campaign. Similarly, Ecker et al.’s (2014) study of racial attitudes finds those attitudes do not change the effectiveness of discounting information. Looking at similar attitudes, Garrett et al. (2013) find no evidence of these backfire effects in a study about a proposed Islamic cultural center in New York City. By contrast, Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) find evidence for a backfire effect in a vaccines context as well as in the case of being correctly informed about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
This research note reports a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccines study embedded within a larger experimental study of flu vaccine intentions and attitudes. Data generated in the experiment do not replicate the backfire effect or the finding that corrections reduce misperceptions about vaccine safety. This suggests that more work is needed to validate the backfire effect, establishing the conditions under which it occurs and the size of its effect.
Keywords Vaccine, replication, backfire effect, misperception
Abstract: Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) document a “backfire effect,” wherein attempts to correct factual misperceptions increase the prevalence of false beliefs. These results are widely cited both in and outside of political science. In this research note, I report the results of a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccine study that was embedded in a larger study about flu vaccines. The backfire effect was not replicated in my experiment. The main replication result suggests the need for additional studies to verify the backfire effect and identify conditions under which it occurs.
Introduction
Political scientists are increasingly aware of the effect of misperceptions on behavioral intentions and attitudes. While Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) famously note that most citizens do not have much factual knowledge about politics, Kuklinski et al. (2000) point out the differences between being uninformed and misinformed. When a person is misinformed, false, misleading, or unsubstantiated information can create the basis for their policy preferences. Further, the sources used to obtain the misinformation are often directly related to a person’s political preferences.
While there is some evidence that providing relevant facts has the ability to change people’s issue opinions (Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000), information is often received in a much noisier environment. Other studies have found that individuals are often resistant to evidence that contradicts their opinions (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). The literature, however, remains unsettled as to exactly when and how misperceptions can be corrected. In addition, the role of the “backfire effect,” where corrective information can actually make false beliefs more prevalent, in these processes remains unclear. For example, Weeks and Garrett (2014) do not find evidence for the backfire effect in a study about correcting rumors in the 2008 presidential campaign. Similarly, Ecker et al.’s (2014) study of racial attitudes finds those attitudes do not change the effectiveness of discounting information. Looking at similar attitudes, Garrett et al. (2013) find no evidence of these backfire effects in a study about a proposed Islamic cultural center in New York City. By contrast, Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) find evidence for a backfire effect in a vaccines context as well as in the case of being correctly informed about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
This research note reports a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccines study embedded within a larger experimental study of flu vaccine intentions and attitudes. Data generated in the experiment do not replicate the backfire effect or the finding that corrections reduce misperceptions about vaccine safety. This suggests that more work is needed to validate the backfire effect, establishing the conditions under which it occurs and the size of its effect.
Keywords Vaccine, replication, backfire effect, misperception
In the Red: The Effects of Color on Investment Behavior
In the Red: The Effects of Color on Investment Behavior. William Bazley, Henrik Cronqvist & Milica Mormann. University of Miami Working Paper, June 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992812
Abstract: Financial decisions in today's society are made in environments that involve color stimuli. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the effects of color on investment behavior. First, we find that when investors are displayed potential losses in red, risk taking is reduced. Second, when investors are shown past negative stock price paths in red, expectations about future stock returns are reduced. Consistent with red causing "avoidance behavior," red color reduces investors' propensity to purchase stocks. The findings are robust to a series of checks involving colorblind investors and alternative colors to control for salience effects. Finally, the effects are muted in a cultural setting, e.g., China, where red is not used to visualize financial losses. A contribution of this study is to introduce hypotheses from color psychology and visual science to enhance our understanding of the behavior of individual investors.
Keywords: Investment behavior; Color psychology
JEL Classification: G02, G11
Abstract: Financial decisions in today's society are made in environments that involve color stimuli. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the effects of color on investment behavior. First, we find that when investors are displayed potential losses in red, risk taking is reduced. Second, when investors are shown past negative stock price paths in red, expectations about future stock returns are reduced. Consistent with red causing "avoidance behavior," red color reduces investors' propensity to purchase stocks. The findings are robust to a series of checks involving colorblind investors and alternative colors to control for salience effects. Finally, the effects are muted in a cultural setting, e.g., China, where red is not used to visualize financial losses. A contribution of this study is to introduce hypotheses from color psychology and visual science to enhance our understanding of the behavior of individual investors.
Keywords: Investment behavior; Color psychology
JEL Classification: G02, G11
Does Subjective SES Moderate the Effect of Money Priming on System Support? A Replication of Schuler and Wänke (2016)
Does Subjective SES Moderate the Effect of Money Priming on System Support? A Replication of Schuler and Wänke (2016). Jarret Crawford & Allison Fournier, https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/c43bk/
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) reported that subtle money cues impacted a range of behaviors, including working independently without asking for assistance, contributing less to charity, and providing less assistance to experimenters and confederates. Other research found that money priming effects decreased empathy, compassion, and people’s willingness to volunteer and donate time and money (Chatterjee, Rose, & Sinha, 2013; Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009).
Further, Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013) reasoned that because money is a symbol of American free-market capitalism, subtle money reminders would make people more accepting of free-market and other belief systems that justify existing structural inequality. They reported five studies suggesting that money priming increased support for such beliefs systems (i.e., System Justification, Belief in a Just World [BJW], Social Dominance Orientation, and Fair Market Ideology).
These findings have been called into question by notable failed replication attempts.
[...]
We conclude that the original findings may have been the result of sampling error, and the findings of “small telescopes” analyses are consistent with this conclusion. We discuss implications for money priming effects, and replication attempts in general.
Keywords: money priming; system justification; BJW; priming effects; replication
My Spanish commentary: many who I know are supportive of free markets and do not contribute less to charities or help less coworkers (being very, very competitive at the same time)... They just re-orient my contributions from organizations perceived as failures or corrupt ones (an example is any European Red Cross society, which brags about their universal, impartial, neutral, etc., character, but does not deliver) to others perceived as less crooked in their conduct codes and actual behavior (American Red Cross). Or don't give to child cancer research, which produces very scant results in disorganized societies, but contribute to medical organizations that are the best in their city and are in the first position in the place they live in (Mount Sinai Hospital, Barcelona Clinic Hospital, La Paz Hospital). Or do not contribute to museums or libraries in disorganized societies, but contribute to others perceived as with top-notch credentials (Library of Congress). Or do not volunteer for traditional parties, but help and contribute to other parties and organizations (e.g., Libertarian ones). This is just a bunch of anecdotes, but many people with lots of money and assets contribute a lot. Obviously those non-replicable studies are quite defective... too many exceptions.
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) reported that subtle money cues impacted a range of behaviors, including working independently without asking for assistance, contributing less to charity, and providing less assistance to experimenters and confederates. Other research found that money priming effects decreased empathy, compassion, and people’s willingness to volunteer and donate time and money (Chatterjee, Rose, & Sinha, 2013; Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009).
Further, Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013) reasoned that because money is a symbol of American free-market capitalism, subtle money reminders would make people more accepting of free-market and other belief systems that justify existing structural inequality. They reported five studies suggesting that money priming increased support for such beliefs systems (i.e., System Justification, Belief in a Just World [BJW], Social Dominance Orientation, and Fair Market Ideology).
These findings have been called into question by notable failed replication attempts.
[...]
We conclude that the original findings may have been the result of sampling error, and the findings of “small telescopes” analyses are consistent with this conclusion. We discuss implications for money priming effects, and replication attempts in general.
Keywords: money priming; system justification; BJW; priming effects; replication
My Spanish commentary: many who I know are supportive of free markets and do not contribute less to charities or help less coworkers (being very, very competitive at the same time)... They just re-orient my contributions from organizations perceived as failures or corrupt ones (an example is any European Red Cross society, which brags about their universal, impartial, neutral, etc., character, but does not deliver) to others perceived as less crooked in their conduct codes and actual behavior (American Red Cross). Or don't give to child cancer research, which produces very scant results in disorganized societies, but contribute to medical organizations that are the best in their city and are in the first position in the place they live in (Mount Sinai Hospital, Barcelona Clinic Hospital, La Paz Hospital). Or do not contribute to museums or libraries in disorganized societies, but contribute to others perceived as with top-notch credentials (Library of Congress). Or do not volunteer for traditional parties, but help and contribute to other parties and organizations (e.g., Libertarian ones). This is just a bunch of anecdotes, but many people with lots of money and assets contribute a lot. Obviously those non-replicable studies are quite defective... too many exceptions.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
