Unpopularity of atheists: National studies (US, Sweden) consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations)

The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality. Tomas Ståhl. PLoS One. 2021 Feb 24;16(2):e0246593, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0246593

Abstract: There is a widespread cross-cultural stereotype suggesting that atheists are untrustworthy and lack a moral compass. Is there any truth to this notion? Building on theory about the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, the present research investigated whether there are reliable similarities as well as differences between believers and disbelievers in the moral values and principles they endorse. Four studies examined how religious disbelief (vs. belief) relates to endorsement of various moral values and principles in a predominately religious (vs. irreligious) country (the U.S. vs. Sweden). Two U.S. M-Turk studies (Studies 1A and 1B, N = 429) and two large cross-national studies (Studies 2-3, N = 4,193), consistently show that disbelievers (vs. believers) are less inclined to endorse moral values that serve group cohesion (the binding moral foundations). By contrast, only minor differences between believers and disbelievers were found in endorsement of other moral values (individualizing moral foundations, epistemic rationality). It is also demonstrated that presumed cultural and demotivational antecedents of disbelief (limited exposure to credibility-enhancing displays, low existential threat) are associated with disbelief. Furthermore, these factors are associated with weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries (Study 2). Most of these findings were replicated in Study 3, and results also show that disbelievers (vs. believers) have a more consequentialist view of morality in both countries. A consequentialist view of morality was also associated with another presumed antecedent of disbelief-analytic cognitive style.

Discussion

The results of this study closely replicated the findings from Study 2. Disbelievers (vs. believers) were once again less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations in both countries, whereas disbelief explained miniscule amounts of variance in endorsement of the individualizing moral foundations, Liberty/oppression, and moralization of epistemic rationality. Also consistent with results of Study 2, exposure to CREDs was a strong predictor of endorsement of the binding moral foundations in both countries. Going beyond Study 2, higher levels of ACS were associated with lower levels of endorsement of the binding moral foundations. Moreover, once differences in exposure to CREDs and ACS had been controlled for, disbelief (vs. belief) explained only a small amount of variance in endorsement of the binding moral foundations. Thus, results were once again consistent with the notion that exposure to CREDs help explain why believers endorse the binding moral foundations more than disbelievers. This study also provided initial evidence consistent with the idea that differences in cognitive style help explain the negative association between disbelief and endorsement of the binding moral foundations. Results also showed that mentalizing abilities were associated with higher levels of endorsement of the binding moral foundations. Mentalizing abilities were also positively associated with stronger endorsement of the individualizing moral foundations. However, these relationships do not help account for differences in moral values between believers and disbelievers, as mentalizing abilities were unrelated to disbelief.

Disbelievers (vs. believers) were also more inclined to endorse consequentialist thinking, an association that was slightly stronger among Swedes (vs. Americans). Finally, there was some evidence consistent with the notion that differences in cognitive style help account for why disbelievers (vs. believers) are more inclined to endorse a consequentialist view of morality, as ACS was positively associated with consequentialist thinking, and also accounted for a small part of the difference in consequentialist thinking between disbelievers and believers. However, disbelief remained a stronger predictor of consequentialist thinking than ACS, mentalizing and CREDs. Thus, there appear to be additional unknown factors that contribute to higher levels of consequentialist thinking among disbelievers (vs. believers).

General discussion

Although cross-cultural stereotypes suggest that atheists lack a moral compass [8], no studies to date have systematically examined to what extent disbelievers’ and believers’ conceptualizations of morality are distinct. The purpose of the present research was to fill that gap. Based on current theorizing in moral psychology, I identified a highly plausible difference in moral values between believers and disbelievers. Specifically, it has been proposed that a core function of religion is to create highly cohesive communities that serve to promote cooperation and to prevent free-riding as societies increase in size [21, 76, 77]. Based on Moral Foundations Theory, it has further been proposed that religious communities generally promote moral values that serve group cohesion [21]. Based on this analysis it was hypothesized that disbelievers (vs. believers) should be less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations. Across four studies, strong support was found for this prediction. In two U.S. M-Turk samples (Studies 1A and 1B), as well as two large cross-national samples (Studies 2–3), disbelievers were considerably less inclined than believers to endorse the binding moral foundations. Notably, this was the case in a country where religious belief is the norm (the U.S.) as well as in one of the most secular countries in the world (Sweden). Thus, the negative association between disbelief and endorsement of the binding moral foundations was independent of the normative status of religious belief in society. Moreover, this association was only slightly weakened when controlling for socially desirable responding (Study 1B), and remained robust (albeit weaker) when controlling for political orientation (all four studies). By contrast, and again consistent across all studies, disbelief (vs. belief) only explained miniscule amounts of variance in endorsement of moral values that serve to protect vulnerable individuals (the individualizing moral foundations) and Liberty/oppression. Furthermore, disbelief (vs. belief) was unrelated to amorality (Studies 1A, 1B), and explained only a miniscule amount of variance in moralization of epistemic rationality (Studies 2–3).

The moral psychology literature also suggests that disbelievers are more inclined than believers to form moral judgments on the basis of the consequences of specific actions compared to inaction [57–59]. This finding was replicated in Study 3. American as well as Swedish disbelievers (vs. believers) were indeed more inclined to rely on consequentialist thinking, an association that was slightly stronger among Swedes. In short, the present four studies suggest that believers and disbelievers share similar moral concerns about protecting vulnerable individuals, Liberty/oppression, and about being epistemically rational. They also score equally low on amorality. However, disbelievers (vs. believers) are (1) considerably less inclined to endorse moral values that promote group cohesion, but (2) more inclined to form moral judgments about harm based on the specific consequences of actions.

Explaining moral disagreements between believers and disbelievers

In addition to mapping the similarities and differences in the moral values and principles endorsed by disbelievers and believers, a second aim of the present research was to explore where moral psychological differences between these groups may stem from. A set of hypotheses were derived based on an integration of insights regarding cultural, (de)motivational and cognitive antecedents of disbelief [27] and current theorizing in moral psychology. First, many CREDs not only signal the credibility and importance of specific religious beliefs, but also of the broader religious community. Based on this observation it was proposed that lower exposure to CREDs may contribute to weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations among disbelievers (vs. believers). Second, based on a substantial literature linking various existential threats to increased group cohesion [34, 51–54], it was proposed that lower existential threat may also contribute to weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations among disbelievers (vs. believers). Third, based on some recent evidence linking an intuitive cognitive style (low ACS) to disgust sensitivity and endorsement of the binding moral foundations [55], it was proposed that high ACS may also contribute to lower endorsement of the binding moral foundations among disbelievers (vs. believers).

Previous research on the moral psychological consequences of analytic thinking [57, 60–63] also led to the prediction that ACS should account for disbelievers’ (vs. believers) higher inclination to rely on consequentialist moral reasoning. Finally, and more speculatively, it was proposed that ACS may also help account for disbelievers’ stronger inclination to moralize epistemic rationality.

The present research provided support for all of these predictions but one. First, results supported the predictions that CREDs, existential threat, and cognitive style should help explain differences between believers and disbelievers in their level of endorsement of the binding moral foundations. Low (vs. high) exposure to CREDs (Studies 2 & 3), low (vs. high) existential threat (Study 2), and high (vs. low) ACS (Study 3) in large part accounted for the weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations observed among disbelievers (vs. believers) in both countries. Results also provided some support for the prediction that differences in cognitive style help explain why disbelievers (vs believers) are more inclined to rely on consequentialist moral reasoning (Study 3). Specifically, high (vs. low) ACS contributed slightly to disbelievers’ (vs. believers’) stronger reliance on consequentialist moral reasoning. However, no support was found for the prediction that differences in cognitive style contribute to differences between disbelievers and believers in their inclination to moralize epistemic rationality, as disbelief (Studies 2–3) and ACS (Study 3) explained only a miniscule amount of variance in moralized rationality.

Theoretical and practical implications

The present findings paint a clear and consistent picture of how disbelievers in the U.S. and in Sweden conceptualize morality, and provide some initial evidence of the processes that may explain why they view morality in this way. First and foremost, this data suggests that the cross-cultural stereotype of atheists as lacking a moral compass is inaccurate. In fact, the data suggests that disbelievers share many of the moral values endorsed by believers, and they score equally low on amoral tendencies. Notably, these findings are consistent with, and complement, experience sampling research showing that disbelievers and believers engage in (self-defined) moral and immoral behaviors at the same rate [13]. At the same time, the present research also suggests that disbelievers have a more constrained view of morality than believers do, in that they are less inclined to endorse the binding moral foundations, and more inclined to judge the morality of actions that inflict harm on a consequentialist, case-by-case basis. It is worth noting that moral character evaluations of people who make decisions based on consequentialist (vs. rule-based) principles are more negative, because consequentialists are perceived as less empathic [78]. In the light of such findings it seems plausible that atheists’ inclination to rely on consequentialist principles, along with their weak endorsement of the binding moral foundations, may to some degree have contributed to their reputation as lacking in moral character.

The present findings also have implications for our understanding of where disbelievers moral values and principles stem from. Atheism merely implies the absence of religious belief, and says nothing about what positive beliefs the disbeliever holds. I therefore argue that disbelief itself should contribute little to the endorsement of moral values and principles. Disbelief may contribute to the rejection of specific moral rules that stem from, or are closely associated with, religion (e.g., “You should not eat pork”, “you should not work on the Sabbath”). However, it seems implausible that disbelief itself causes people to adopt certain moral principles (e.g., consequentialism), or to discard broad classes of values as irrelevant for morality (e.g., the binding moral foundations). Instead, it has been argued in the present article that unique features of disbelievers’ morality may stem from the cultural, (de)motivational, and cognitive antecedents of their disbelief. The present studies provided support for this line of reasoning, as three of the four presumed antecedents of disbelief examined were associated with the moral profile of disbelievers. Low exposure to CREDs, low levels of existential threat, and high ACS were associated with the weaker endorsement of the binding moral foundations observed among disbelievers (vs. believers). Furthermore, high ACS, and low exposure to CREDs were (slightly) associated with the higher levels of consequentialist thinking observed among disbelievers (vs. believers). Having said that, however, it is important to note that the present data was correlational in nature. As a consequence, conclusions cannot be drawn about the causal role of these presumed antecedents of disbelief in the process of moral value acquisition and rejection. I will return to this point below.

Limitations and suggestions for future research

The present research constitutes the first systematic examination of the moral values and principles endorsed by disbelievers, and the processes through which they may be acquired. As such it represents an important first step in the process of explaining the relationship between disbelief and morality. However, the studies reported in this article have a number of limitations that should be addressed in future studies. First and foremost, the present studies relied exclusively on self-reported moral values and principles. Although this approach provided important insights regarding how disbelievers (vs. believers) think about morality, future studies should examine what the behavioral consequences are of these similarities and differences in moral values and principles. Because moral stances are often particularly strong predictors of behavior, there are reasons to believe that the differences in moral values and principles between disbelievers and believers observed in the present studies could have important behavioral implications in various domains. However, it should also be noted that religious belief is positively associated with reputational concerns [23], which can also promote prosocial behavior [24, 25]. It therefore seems plausible that moral values and principles may serve as somewhat weaker predictors of behavior among disbelievers (vs. believers), at least when other people are present [11, see also 79].

Another limitation of the present research is the exclusive reliance on cross-sectional data. Although the results are consistent with the notion that presumed antecedents of disbelief help explain why disbelievers’ (vs. believers’) views of morality differ, the cross-sectional designs employed in these studies do not allow for conclusions about causal relationships. Future studies should further examine these relationships using methods that enable causal conclusions. In particular, confidence in the current interpretation of these results would increase considerably with corroborating evidence from longitudinal and experimental studies.

The main purpose of the present research was to examine how people who do not believe in God think about morality, and to compare their views about morality with those of people who do believe in God. Participants in the two large cross-national surveys were therefore explicitly asked whether they believed in God or not, and those who reported not knowing whether they were believers or not were dropped. Although this classification may seem simplistic, it served to ensure that comparisons were made between people who did (vs. did not) believe in God. These studies also included a continuous measure of belief (vs. disbelief) strength. However, because scores on this measure deviated drastically from normality, and because results did not substantially alter any of the results reported in this article, those analyses were reported elsewhere (see S1 Text). It is also worth noting that results were strikingly similar when using a continuous measure of level of religiosity (Studies 1A-1B). The consistent results across different measures indicate that the present findings are not an artefact of a particular method of assessing religious disbelief (vs. belief). That said, however, future studies should expand on the present studies and examine the extent to which differences between disbelievers’ and believers’ views about morality vary as a function of the kind of religious beliefs that people endorse.

Related to the point above, although it is a notable strength of the present research that similar results were obtained across multiple studies, using large samples from two countries in which the populations differ dramatically in disbelief (vs. belief), the U.S. and Sweden are nonetheless relatively similar countries in many respects. For example, religious believers are predominantly Christian in both countries, and both cultures are WEIRD (i.e., Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic). Future research is needed to determine whether the moral psychological similarities and differences observed between disbelievers and believers hold up in non-WEIRD cultures, and in cultures where other religious beliefs are the norm.